. Rejection by the PIO with out valid grounds do not take away the legal mandate of providing information with out charge after the time limit Sec 7(6):
In the case of Mr.Rakesh Agarwal, Vs Mr. K.S. Rawat, PIO,Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. Administration Branch I, Office of the District & Session Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi-110001Decision No. CIC /SG/A/2009/000675/3390
Appeal No. CIC/ SG/A/2009/000675 .
The appellant sought the information regarding :
1. Whether intimations are sent by each traffic court of Delhi presided over by Spl. M.M.S. as required by Section 210 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988?
2. If not, reasons for the same.
3. If yes, copies of all such intimations that pertain to convictions on 9 and 10 January 2008 across all traffic courts of Delhi.
PIO replied as given below:
The information requested for was not information held by or under the control of any public authority and therefore did not fall under Section 2 (f), RTI Act. Further, the Appellant was representing the news paper/magazine called “Nyay Bhumi” and within fifteen days had filed three applications vide ID. Nos. 1291, 1290 and 1321. If the Appellant was working for promotion of his business rather then serving the social interest, it was a blatant misuse of RTI Act as held in Appeal no. 23/IC/A/2006.
Appellant was not satisfied with the PIOs reply and gone for First Appeal stating that the PIO's response was wrong and misplaced. FAA allowed the appeal and directed the PIO to collect the information from the courts of special M.M.s dealing with traffic cases and send it to the Appellant within 20 days.
However, PIO demanded payment for providing information thereby violating Section 7(6). The Appellant received the FAA's order on 25/02/2009 thereby exceeding the time limit of 45 days. So he has gone for the second appeal.
Judgement: Reasons / Decision: CIC allowed the appeal and commented on the PIOs refusal to give the information initially claiming what was sought was not information as defined under Section 2(f) of the RTI Act. The Commission finds it difficult to imagine how “whether intimations are being sent by each traffic court of Delhi presided over by Spl. M.M.S. as per Section 210, M.V. Act” is not information as defined under the RTI Act.
The PIO has given written submissions and stated during the hearing “Section 7(1) envisaged that information has been provided or rejected. Section 7(6) states that if information has not been provided by the authority and does not contain the word reject. In the present case I have rejected and the appellate authority has allowed the information and I have collected the information within the period specified by the appellate authority and after that a notice was issued to the appellant for depositing the cost of paper that is rupees Rs.2/- per page. If the section 7(6) is applicable in all cases like this case then the Appellate Authority cannot direct the PIO to provide information free of cost. I have made a decision which is the subject matter of the Appellate Authority to set aside or to accept the same.”
Judgement: The Commission finds the position of law as proposed by the PIO with regard to payment of fees untenable. Section 7(6) states that …person making request for information shall be provided the information free of charge where a public authority fails to comply with the time limits specified in sub-section (1). Section 7(1) provides “…either provide the information on payment of such fees as may be prescribed or reject the request for any of the reasons specified in sections 8 and 9.”
It is a basic tenet of statutory interpretation that words of a statute should be interpreted keeping in mind the context in which they appear. Information is to be provided free of cost if Section 7(1) is not complied with. If a ground for exemption from disclosure is wrongly relied upon, then it does not amount to 'rejection of a request' as stated in Section 7(1). It is absurd to contend that the Appellant must be made to pay the additional fees when the PIO wrongly denies information. The Commission finds the PIO's deliberate misconstruction of the law unacceptable.
This is an attempt to obstruct the implementation of the RTI Act and to delay the provision of information to the Appellant without any reasonable cause. The Commission finds that the PIO on several occasions, all of which are on record, has made unwarranted and irrelevant observations which give the impression that the PIO is malafidely denying information to the Appellant. The Commission strongly advises the PIO to refrain from making such comments in future.
The PIO has also stated in his reply to the First Appellate Authority that as Section 6(1) of the Act includes the word 'specify', the question of the Appellant should be specific and not general. If the information required is general in nature it is not possible for the PIO to give information within the stipulated time. The applicant mentioned in his application 'all courts' which is general in nature. The Appellant's RTI application is specific as he asks for information pertaining to convictions decided on two dates in all traffic courts in Delhi and the PIO's allegation that the request is too general is baseless.
In his reply to the Appellant's RTI application, the PIO writes: “it reveals that you are representing your news paper/magazine…and within fifteen days you have filed three applications… if you are working for promotion of your business rather then serving the social interest, this is a blatant misuse of Right to Information Act…”
Insofar as looking at the Appellant's reasons for requesting for information is concerned, the lawmaker has categorically stated in Section 6 (2)- 'An applicant making request for information shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information or any other personal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him.'
All these instances lead the Commission to believe that the PIO was malafidely denying information to the appellant by making observations which are misplaced in law and fact. From the foregoing it appears that the PIO first refused to give information to the Appellant on a baseless ground that what was sought was not information; then the First Appellate Authority ordered PIO to give the information rejecting his contention. He sought further fees from the Appellant for which he had no valid ground. Thus it appears that the PIO has deliberately and without reasonable cause malafidely denied information to the Appellant.
The appeal is allowed. The Commission directs the PIO to provide the information to the Appellant free of cost.