Any order is appealable

In Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share Holders Welfare Association Vs. S.C. Sekar and Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 784 it is ruled that in contempt cases even if no appeal lies then also the aggrieved person cannot be left without remedy. Access to justice is a human right. In certain situations it may also be considered to be a fundamental right. It is ruled as under; 86 “51. We will, however, proceed on the assumption that no appeal was maintainable. An aggrieved person cannot be left without a remedy. Access to justice is a human right. In certain situations it may also be considered to be a fundamental right. (See Tashi Delek Gaming Solutions Ltd. v. State of Karnataka AIR2006SC661 and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India (2007) 6 SCC 120.) 52. Concededly this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a special leave petition. When the entire matter is before us this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India may pass such orders which would do complete justice to the parties. [See - T. Vijendradas v. M. Subramanian AIR 2008 SC 563]. 43. A similar view had been taken in Ashis Chakraborty and others v. Hindustan Lever Sramik Karamchari Congress and others, [ 96 CWN 673], by the Calcutta High Court, stating:- " We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that Section 19(1) does not merely speak of an appeal lying only against punishment for contempt but uses the expression that an appeal lies from any 'order or decision' passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. As regards the meaning of the expression "any order or decision" we understand a variety of orders and decisions that may be passed by a court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Our own High Court in 1981 (2) CHN page 97 Ranjit Chatterjee v. Rambadan Choubey held that if the order or decision prejudicially affects a party, he has indeed a right of appeal. If no other order except punishment would have 87 been appealable, there would have ' been no necessity of using the words "any order or decision'1 in the expression "the execution of the punishment or order appeal against" as used in Section 19(2)(a) of the Act. If the scope of appeal Under Section 19 is restricted only to punishment imposed Under Section 12 and nothing beyond, then a person who is ex facie found guilty of contempt Under Section 14 and is detained in custody pending the hearing on the charge of contempt and is refused bail, would have no right of appeal against such refusal of bail pending the decision on the charge of contempt which will amount to deprive the alleged contemner of the right of appeal in such circumstances. If in case of such an exigency, where he is directed to be released on a particular bond which is found to be much excessive, his right is to be defeated to a large extent and the very purpose of making provision for appeal to give relief in appropriate cases will be lost. We are of the clear view that while the contemner is detained in custody Under Section 14 pending determination of the charge, there is no punishment imposed on him as yet Under Section 12. The contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that the detention in such circumstances would also be a form of punishment Under Section 12 is really untenable. The legislature in its wisdom does not use surplus words but obviously uses such words which would advance its object and would remove the mischief of ambiguity. We have exhaustibly dealt with all the contingencies in this regard over appealability or otherwise of an order or decision in Ashoke Kumar Rai v. Ashoke Arora, F.M.A.T. No. 2146 of 1991 decided by us on 17.12.91 to hold that even though it was Stated in D.N. Taneja v. 88 Bhajanlal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 that unless a punishment is imposed, no appeal lies against it, at best relates to a case of criminal contempt and nothing beyond and if any order or decision is arrived at deciding any bone of contention or any issue in the controversy, an appeal lies." 44. It is also relevant to notice that a Division Bench of this Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda [(2006) 5 SCC 399] opined as under: (SCC pp. 411 and 413-14, paras 11 and 15) “11. (v) If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceeding, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intracourt appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases). *** 15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories: (i) to (iii)*** (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties.” 46. We will, however, proceed on the assumption that no appeal was maintainable. An aggrieved person cannot be 89 left without a remedy. Access to justice is a human right. In certain situations it may also be considered to be a fundamental right. (See Tashi Delek Gaming Solutions Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, [(2006) 1 SCC 442] and Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, [(2007) 6 SCC 120].” 13.12. Ratio laid down in the case of Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot (1978) 3 SCC 544 (Supra) & in Tamilnad Mercantile Bank (2009) 2 SCC 784 (Supra) are upheld by the Constitution Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan, (2016) 8 SCC 509