there is no unlimited discretion to Judges of Supreme Court and Supreme Court has to act as per the procedure and limits given in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and The Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975.

That larger Bench of Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1 had specifically ruled that there is no unlimited discretion available to Judges of all levels. The ratio in judgment of Prakash Chand’s case is upheld by the Constitution Bench in the case of Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 196 by holding that the said ratio is applicable to Judges of the Supreme Court and any order in contravention of it is nullity and should not be followed by any authority. It is ruled as under;

‘‘10. The rules have been framed in that regard. True, the rules deal with reference, but the law laid down in Prakash Chand [State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1] has to apply to the Supreme Court so that there will be smooth functioning of the Court and there is no 9 chaos in the administration of justice dispensation system. If any such order has been passed by any Bench, that cannot hold the field as that will be running counter to the order passed by the Constitution Bench.’’

6.2. Furthermore a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 had ruled that there is no unbridled power available to Supreme Court & High Court Judges and they have to act within the limits prescribed under Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971 it is ruled as under;

“31. This Court has always frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature, it would stand to reason that the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be construed harmoniously.”

“32. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 inter alia provides for what is not to be regarded as contempt; it specifies in Section 12 the maximum punishment which can be imposed; procedure to be followed where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or in the High Court or cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases is provided by Sections 14 and 15; the procedure to be followed after taking cognizance is provided by Section 17; Section 18 provides that in every case of criminal contempt under Section 15 the same shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges; 10 Section 19 gives the right of appeal from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. There is no challenge to the validity of any of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act as being violative or in conflict with any provisions of the Constitution. Barring observations of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case [(1998) 4 SCC 409] where it did not express any opinion on the question whether maximum punishment fixed by the 1971 Act was binding on the Court, no doubt has been expressed about the validity of any provision of the 1971 Act. In exercise of its constitutional power, this Court has, on the other hand, applied the provisions of the Act while exercising jurisdiction under Article 129 or 215 of the Constitution. In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi case [AIR 1954 SC 186 : 1954 Cri LJ 460 : 1954 SCR 454] it recognised that the 1926 Act placed a limitation on the amount of punishment which could be imposed. Baradakanta Mishra case [(1975) 3 SCC 535 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 99] was decided on the interpretation of Section 19 of the 1971 Act, namely, there was no right of appeal if the court did not take action or initiate contempt proceedings. In the case of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar case [1989 Supp (2) SCC 418 : 1989 Supp (1) SCR 223] the Court did not hold that Section 20 of the 1971 Act was inapplicable. It came to the conclusion that the application for initiating contempt proceedings was within time and limitation had to be calculated as for the purpose of limitation date of filing was relevant and furthermore that was a case of continuing wrong. In Kartick Chandra Das case [(1996) 5 SCC 342] the provisions of the Limitation Act were held to be applicable in dealing with application under Section 5 in connection with 11 an appeal filed under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. A three-Judge Bench in Dr L.P. Misra case [(1998) 7 SCC 379] observed that the procedure provided by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution. It would, therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided.”