Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be used in pmla cases

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.102  OF 2021
   (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.4171 of 2020)
OPTO Circuit India Ltd.            Versus
Axis Bank & Ors.                                         
3 Judge bench , through the  J U D G M E N T of A.S. Bopanna, J., held that

12. Mr. S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General
made   a   subtle   attempt   to   contend   that   the   power   of
seizure is available under Section 102 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which has been exercised and as
 
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such the freezing of the account would remain valid.  We
are unable to appreciate and accept such contention for
more than one reason.  Firstly, as noted, it has been the
contention of Respondent No.4 that PMLA is a standalone enactment.  If that be so and when such enactment
contains a provision for seizure which includes freezing,
the power available therein is to be exercised and the
procedure   contemplated   therein   is   to   be   complied.
Secondly, when the power is available under the special
enactment, the question of resorting to the power under
the general law does not arise.  Thirdly, the power under
Section   102   CrPC   is   to   the   Police   Officer   during   the
course of investigation and the scheme of the provision is
different from the scheme under PMLA.   Further, even
sub­section (3) to Section 102 CrPC requires that the
Police Officer shall forthwith report the seizure to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction, the compliance of which is
also not shown if the said provision was in fact invoked.
That   apart,   the   impugned   communication   dated
 
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15.05.2020 does not refer to the power being exercised
under the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
13. The action sought to be sustained should be with
reference   to   the   contents   of   the   impugned
order/communication and the same cannot be justified
by improving the same through the contention raised in
the objection statement or affidavit filed before the Court.
This has been succinctly laid down by this Court in the
case of  Mohinder Singh Gill & Another vs. The Chief
Election  Commissioner,  New  Delhi  &  Ors.   (1978) 1
SCC 405) as follows;
8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a
statutory   functionary   makes   an   order   based   on
certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the
reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented
by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise.
Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the
time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get
validated by additional grounds later brought out. We
may here draw attention to the observations of Bose
J. in Gordhandas Bhanji:
  (1) Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a
statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of
explanations subsequently given by the officer making
the order of what he meant, or of what was in his
mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made
by public authorities are meant to have public effect
and are intended to effect the actings and conduct of
those   to   whom   they   are   addressed   and   must   be
 
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construed objectively with reference to the language
used in the order itself.
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they
grow older:
In fact, in the instant case such contention of having
exercised power under Section 102 CrPC has not been
put   forth   even   in   the   counter   affidavit,   either   in   this
appeal or before the High Court and has only been the
attempted ingenuity of the learned Additional Solicitor
General.  Such contention, therefore, cannot be accepted.
In fact, in the objection statement filed before the High
Court   much   emphasis   has   been   laid   on   the   power
available   under   PMLA   and   the   same   being   exercised
though   without   specifically   referring   to   the   power
available under Section 17 of PMLA.