without due procedure be unfreezed

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.102  OF 2021
   (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.4171 of 2020)
OPTO Circuit India Ltd.            Versus
Axis Bank & Ors.                                         
3 Judge bench , through the  J U D G M E N T of A.S. Bopanna, J., held that the consideration to be made in this appeal is therefore
 
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limited to the aspect of freezing/defreezing the account,
more particularly keeping in view the requirement of the
appellant to make the statutory payments even if the
freezing of the account is found justified.
7. While adverting to this aspect of the matter, what
cannot be lost sight is also the fact as to whether the
power   available   to   the   competent   authority   has   been
exercised in the manner as is contemplated under PMLA.
The   Directorate   of   Enforcement   (Respondent   No.4)   in
their   counter   affidavit   has   taken   contradictory   stand
inasmuch   as,   while   explaining   the   need   to   freeze   the
account   has   stated   that   the   stop   operation   was
requested   to   stop   the   further   layering/diversion   of
proceeds of crime and to safeguard the proceeds of crime,
which we notice is a power available under PMLA.  But in
the counter affidavit it is strangely stated that the same
has  not  been  done  under Section  17(1) of  the  PMLA.
However, in contrast it has been further averred with
regard to the power available under PMLA and that PMLA
being a stand­alone enactment and independent process
 
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whereunder Section 71 of PMLA has an overriding affect
over  other  laws.   Irrespective of  the  stand taken,  the
power exercised by the Competent Authority should be
shown to be in the manner as has been provided in law,
in this case under PMLA.
8. To appreciate this aspect, it would be appropriate
to refer to Section 17 of PMLA whereunder the freezing of
such property or record is also provided. Section 17 of
PMLA reads as hereunder: ­
17.  Search   and   seizure­   (1)  Where   the
Director   or   any  other   officer  not   below   the
rank   of   Deputy   Director   authorized   by   him
for the purposes of this section, on the basis
of information in his possession, has reason
to   believe   (the   reason   for   such   belief   to   be
recorded in writing) that any person­
(i) has   committed   any   act   which
constitutes money­laundering, or
(ii) is in possession of any proceeds of
crime   involved   in   moneylaundering, or
(iii) is   in   possession   of   any   records
relating to money­laundering, or
(iv) is   in   possession   of   any   property
related to crime
 
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then,   subject   to   the   rules   made   in   this
behalf,   he   may   authorise   any   officer
subordinate to him to­
(a) Enter   and   search   any   building,
place,   vessel,   vehicle   or   aircraft
where   he   has   reason   to   suspect
that   such   records   or   proceeds   of
crime are kept;
(b) Break   open   the   lock   of   any   door,
box, locker, safe, almirah or  other
receptacle   for   exercising   the
powers   conferred   by   clause   (a)
where   the   keys   thereof   are   not
available;
(c) seize any record or property found
as a result of such search;
(d) place   marks   of   identification   on
such record of property, if required
or   make   or   cause   to   be   made
extracts or copies therefrom;
(e) make   a   note   or   an   inventory   of
such record or property;
(f) examine  on  oath  any  person,  who
is   found   to   be   in   possession   or
control  of  any  record  or  property,
in   respect   of   all  matters   relevant
for   the   purposes   of   any
investigation under this Act:
(1A) Where it is not practicable to seize such
record   or   property,   the   officer   authorised
under sub­section (1), may make an order to
freeze such property whereupon the property
shall   not   be   transferred   or   otherwise   dealt
with, except with the prior permission of the
officer making such order, and a copy of such
order   shall   be   served   on   the   person
concerned:
 
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Provided that if, at any time before its
confiscation   under   sub­section   (5)   or   subsection (7) of section 8 or section 58B or subsection   (2A)   of   section   60,   it   becomes
practical   to   seize   a   frozen   property,   the
officer  authorised under  sub­section  (1) may
seize such property.
(2) The authority, who has been authorised
under sub­section (1) shall, immediately after
search   and   seizure   or  upon   issuance   of   a
freezing order forward a copy of the reasons
so   recorded   along   with   material   in   his
possession, referred to in that sub­section, to
the   Adjudicating   Authority   in   a   sealed
envelope,   in   the   manner,   as   may   be
prescribed   and   such   Adjudicating   Authority
shall keep such reasons and material for such
period, as may be prescribed.
(3) Where   an   authority,   upon   information
obtained  during  survey  under  section  16,   is
satisfied   that   any   evidence   shall   be   or   is
likely  to  be  concealed  or  tampered  with,  he
may,   for   reasons   to  be  recorded   in  writing,
enter and search the building or place where
such   evidence   is   located   and   seize   that
evidence:
Provided that no authorisation referred
to   in   sub­section   (1)   shall   be   required   for
search under this sub­section.
(4) the   authority   seizing   any   record   or
property   under   sub­section   (1)   or   freezing
any record or property under sub­section (1A)
shall,   within   a   period   of   thirty   days   from
such seizure or freezing, as the case may be,
file   an   application,   requesting   for   retention
of such record or property seized under subsection (1) or for continuation of the order of
 
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freezing served under sub­section (1A), before
the Adjudicating Authority.
(emphasis supplied)
9. A perusal of the above provision would indicate
that the pre­requisite is that the Director or such other
Authorised Officer in order to exercise the power under
Section 17 of PMLA, should on the basis of information in
his possession, have reason to believe that such person
has committed acts relating to money laundering and
there is need to seize any record or property found in the
search.  Such belief of the officer should be recorded in
writing.   Sub­section (1A) to Section 17 of PMLA provides
that the Officer Authorised under sub­section (1) may
make an order to freeze such record or property where it
is not practicable to seize such record or property.  Subsection (2) provides that after search and seizure or upon
issuance of a freezing order the Authorised Officer shall
forward   a   copy   of   the   reasons   recorded   along   with
material in his possession to the Adjudicating Authority
in a sealed envelope.   Sub­section (4) provides that the
 
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Authority seizing or freezing any record or property under
sub­section (1) or (1A) shall within a period of thirty days
from such seizure or freezing, as the case may be, file an
application before the Adjudicating Authority requesting
for retention of such record or properties seized.
10. For the purpose of clarity, it is emphasised that the
freezing   of   the   account   will   also   require   the   same
procedure since a bank account having alleged proceeds
of crime would fall both under the ambit property and
records.  In that regard it would be appropriate to take
note   of   Section   2(v)   and   (w)   of   PMLA   which   defines
property and records.  The same read as follows:
Sec.   2(v)   ­   property   ­   means   any
property   or   assets   of   every   description,
whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable
or   immovable,   tangible  or   intangible   and
includes   deeds   and   instruments
evidencing   title   to,   or   interest   in,   such
property or assets, wherever located.
Sec.   2(w)      records      include   the
records  maintained   in  the   form  of  books
or   stored   in   a   computer   or   such   other
form as may be prescribed.
 
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11. The scheme of the PMLA is well intended.  While it
seeks   to   achieve   the   object   of   preventing   money
laundering   and   bring   to   book   the   offenders,   it   also
safeguards   the   rights   of   the   persons   who   would   be
proceeded against under the Act by ensuring fairness in
procedure.   Hence   a   procedure,   including   timeline   is
provided so as to ensure that power is exercised for the
purpose to which the officer is vested with such power
and the Adjudicating Authority is also kept in the loop.
In the instant case, the procedure contemplated under
Section 17 of PMLA to which reference is made above has
not   been   followed   by   the   Officer   Authorised.   Except
issuing the impugned communication dated 15.05.2020
to   AML   Officer   to   seek   freezing,   no   other   procedure
contemplated in law is followed.   In fact, the impugned
communication does not even refer to the belief of the
Authorised   Officer   even   if   the   same   was   recorded
separately.  It only states that the Officer is investigating
the case and seeks for relevant documents, but in the
tabular column abruptly states that the accounts have to
 
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be debit freezed/stop operations.  It certainly is not the
requirement that the communication addressed to the
Bank itself should contain all the details.   But what is
necessary is an order in the file recording the belief as
provided   under   Section   17(1)   of   PMLA   before   the
communication is issued and thereafter the requirement
of Section 17(2) of PMLA after the freezing is made is
complied.   There is no other material placed before the
Court to indicate compliance of Section 17 of PMLA, more
particularly recording the belief of commission of the act
of   money   laundering   and   placing   it   before   the
Adjudicating   Authority   or   for   filing   application   after
securing the freezing of the account to be made.  In that
view, the freezing or the continuation thereof is without
due compliance of the legal requirement and, therefore,
not sustainable.
12. Mr. S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General
made   a   subtle   attempt   to   contend   that   the   power   of
seizure is available under Section 102 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which has been exercised and as
 
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such the freezing of the account would remain valid.  We
are unable to appreciate and accept such contention for
more than one reason.  Firstly, as noted, it has been the
contention of Respondent No.4 that PMLA is a standalone enactment.  If that be so and when such enactment
contains a provision for seizure which includes freezing,
the power available therein is to be exercised and the
procedure   contemplated   therein   is   to   be   complied.
Secondly, when the power is available under the special
enactment, the question of resorting to the power under
the general law does not arise.  Thirdly, the power under
Section   102   CrPC   is   to   the   Police   Officer   during   the
course of investigation and the scheme of the provision is
different from the scheme under PMLA.   Further, even
sub­section (3) to Section 102 CrPC requires that the
Police Officer shall forthwith report the seizure to the
Magistrate having jurisdiction, the compliance of which is
also not shown if the said provision was in fact invoked.
That   apart,   the   impugned   communication   dated
 
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15.05.2020 does not refer to the power being exercised
under the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
13. The action sought to be sustained should be with
reference   to   the   contents   of   the   impugned
order/communication and the same cannot be justified
by improving the same through the contention raised in
the objection statement or affidavit filed before the Court.
This has been succinctly laid down by this Court in the
case of  Mohinder Singh Gill & Another vs. The Chief
Election  Commissioner,  New  Delhi  &  Ors.   (1978) 1
SCC 405) as follows;
8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a
statutory   functionary   makes   an   order   based   on
certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the
reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented
by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise.
Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the
time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get
validated by additional grounds later brought out. We
may here draw attention to the observations of Bose
J. in Gordhandas Bhanji:
  (1) Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a
statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of
explanations subsequently given by the officer making
the order of what he meant, or of what was in his
mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made
by public authorities are meant to have public effect
and are intended to effect the actings and conduct of
those   to   whom   they   are   addressed   and   must   be
 
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construed objectively with reference to the language
used in the order itself.
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they
grow older:
In fact, in the instant case such contention of having
exercised power under Section 102 CrPC has not been
put   forth   even   in   the   counter   affidavit,   either   in   this
appeal or before the High Court and has only been the
attempted ingenuity of the learned Additional Solicitor
General.  Such contention, therefore, cannot be accepted.
In fact, in the objection statement filed before the High
Court   much   emphasis   has   been   laid   on   the   power
available   under   PMLA   and   the   same   being   exercised
though   without   specifically   referring   to   the   power
available under Section 17 of PMLA.
14. The respondent No.4 in the counter affidavit has
stated that the action initiated against the appellant is
based on the complaint dated 02.11.2019 made by the
State   Bank   of   India   alleging   that   the   appellant,   its
Chairman   and   the   Promoter   Directors   have   conspired
 
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and   cheated   them   to   tune   of   Rs.   354.32   crores   by
diversion of funds abroad. In that regard the CBI has
registered   the   case   in   FIR   No.   RC   18(A)/2019   dated
04.11.2019 under Section 120(B) read with Section 420,
468   and   471   IPC   and   under   Section   13(2)   read   with
section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Since the said offences are also schedule offences under
Section   2(1)(x)   and   (y)   of   PMLA,   the   case   in   ECIRBGZO/01/2020   was   recorded   by   the   Directorate   on
02.01.2020 and action is taken to safeguard the alleged
proceeds   of   crime.   On   that   aspect   we   have   already
indicated that the High Court was justified in upholding
the action initiated under the PMLA but the consideration
herein   was   only   with   regard   to   freezing   of   the   bank
account   and   as   to   whether   while   doing   so   the   due
process had been complied by adhering to the procedure
prescribed under Section 17 of PMLA.
15. This Court has time and again emphasised that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular
manner, then it has to be done in that manner alone and
 
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in no other manner.  Among others, in a matter relating
to the presentation of an Election Petition, as per the
procedure prescribed under the Patna High Court Rules,
this Court had an occasion to consider the Rules to find
out   as   to   what   would   be   a   valid   presentation   of   an
Election Petition in the case of Chandra Kishor Jha vs.
Mahavir Prasad and Ors. (1999) 8 SCC 266 and in the
course of consideration observed as hereunder:
It is a well settled salutary principle that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a
particular manner, then it has to be done in
that manner and in no other manner.
Therefore, if the salutary principle is kept in perspective,
in   the   instant   case,   though   the   Authorised   Officer   is
vested with sufficient power; such power is circumscribed
by a procedure laid down under the statute. As such the
power is to be exercised in that manner alone, failing
which it would fall foul of the requirement of complying
due process under law. We have found fault with the
Authorised Officer and declared the action bad only in so
far as not following the legal requirement before and after
 
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freezing the account. This shall not be construed as an
opinion expressed on the merit of the allegation or any
other   aspect   relating   to   the   matter   and   the   action
initiated against the appellant and its Directors which is
a matter to be taken note in appropriate proceedings if at
all any issue is raised by the aggrieved party.     
16. Apart from the above consideration, what has also
engaged the attention of this Court is with regard to the
plea put forth on behalf of the appellant regarding the
need to defreeze the account to enable the appellant to
pay the statutory dues. The appellant in that regard has
relied   on   the   certificate   issued   by   the   Chartered
Accountant,   (Annexure­P/38   at   page   231)   which
indicates   the   amount   payable   towards   ITDS,   PF,   ESI,
Professional   Tax,   Gratuity   and   LIC   employees
deductions, in all amounting to Rs.79,93,124/­. Since we
have indicated that the freezing has been done without
due   compliance   of   law,   it   is   necessary   to   direct   the
respondents No.1 to 3 to defreeze the respective accounts
and clear the cheques issued by the appellant, drawn in
 
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favour of the Competent Authority towards the ITDS, PF,
ESI,   Professional   Tax,   Gratuity   and   LIC   employees
deductions, subject to  availability of  the  funds in  the
account   concerned.   Needless   to   mention   that   if   any
further amount is available in the account after payment
of the statutory dues and with regard to the same any
action is to be taken by the respondent No.4 within a
reasonable time, it would open to them to do so subject
to   compliance   of   the   required   procedure   afresh,   as
contemplated in law.
17. In terms of the above, the communication dated
15.05.2020 is quashed.  We direct that the respondents
shall   defreeze   the   accounts   bearing   Nos.
914020014786978,   200006044354   and   39305709999
and honour payments advised by the appellant towards
statutory   dues   stated   supra.     Liberty   is   reserved   to
Respondent No.4 thereafter to initiate action afresh in
accordance with law, if they so desire.