every organ of the State must act within the limits of its power and carry out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution or the law

S.P. Gupta vs President Of India And Ors. on 30 December, 1981
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1294854/ 16

Supreme Court of India
S.P. Gupta vs President Of India And Ors. on 30 December, 1981
Equivalent citations: AIR 1982 SC 149, 1981 Supp (1) SCC 87, 1982 2 SCR 365
Author: P Bhagwati
Bench: A Gupta, D Desai, E Venkataramiah, P Bhagawati, R Pathak, S M Ali, V Tulzapurkar
JUDGMENT P.N. Bhagwati, J.

Page 16

Is the judicial function primarily aimed at preserving legal order by confining the legislative and
executive organs of government within their powers in the interest of the public (Jurisdiction de
droit objectif) or is it mainly directed towards the protection of private individuals by preventing
illegal encroachments on their individual rights (jurisdiction de droit subjectif)? The first contention
rests on the theory that Courts are the final arbiters of what is legal and illegal ....Requirement? of
locus standi are therefore unnecessary in this case since they merely impede the purpose of the
function as conceived here. On the other hand, where the prime aim of the judicial process is to
protect individual rights, its concern with the regularity of law and administration is limited to the
extent that individual rights are infringed.
We would regard the first proposition as correctly setting out the nature and purpose of the judicial
function, as it is essential to the maintenance of the rule of law that every organ of the State must act
within the limits of its power and carry out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution or the law.
If the State or any public authority acts beyond the scope of its power and thereby causes a specific
legal injury to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would be a case of private
injury actionable in the manner discussed in the preceding paragraphs. So also if the duty is owed by
the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would
give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they
would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress. But if no specific legal injury is caused to
a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the State or any
public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, the question arises as to who can
maintain an action for vindicating the rule of law and setting aside the unlawful action or enforcing
the performance of the public duty. If no one can maintain an action for redress of such public
wrong or public injury, it would be disastrous for the rule of law, for it would be open to the State or
a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty
owed by it. The Courts cannot countenance such a situation where the observance of the law is left to
the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if the law is contravened. The view
has therefore been taken by the Courts in many decisions that whenever there is a public wrong or
public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the
Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can
maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing
which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for
judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the
public who is not a mere busy-body or a meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in
the proceeding. There can be no doubt that the risk of legal action against the State or a public
authority by any citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act with greater
responsibility and care thereby improving the administration of justice. Lord Dip-lock rightly said in
Rex v. Inland Revenue Commrs. (1981) 2 WLR 722 at p. 740:

It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group, like the
federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by out-dated technical rules of
locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the Court to vindicate the rule of law and
get the unlawful conduct stopped.... It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial
review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they
are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are
accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that
Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a Court of Justice for the lawfulness of what
they do, and of that the Court is the only judge.