the principle of iniquity

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10044 OF 2010

CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER,

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ….. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SUBHASH CHANDRA AGARWAL ….. RESPONDENT(S)

W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10045 OF 2010

A N D

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2683 OF 2010

J U D G M E N T

N.V. RAMANA, J.

27. Breach of confidence was not an absolute right and public

interest, incorporated from long time under the common law

jurisprudence. This defence of public interest can be traced to

initial case of Gartside v. Outram, (1856) 26 LJ Ch (NS) 113,

wherein it was held that there is no confidence as to disclosure in

iniquity. This iniquity was later expanded by Lord Denning

in Fraser v. Evans, [1969] 1 QB 349, wherein the iniquity was

referred as merely as an example of ‘justice cause or excuse’ for a

breach of confidence. This iniquity was widened further in Initial

Service v. Putterill, [1968] 1 QB 396, wherein it was held that

iniquity covers any misconduct of nature that it ought to be

disclosed to others in the public interest. In this line of precedents

Thomas Ungoed, J., in Beloff v. Pressdram, [1973] 1 All ER 24,

noted that iniquity would cover ‘any matter, carried out or

contemplated, in breach of country’s security or in breach of law

including statutory duty, fraud or otherwise destructive of the

country or its people and doubtless other misdeeds of similar

gravity.’

28. Eventually the language of iniquity was shaken and discourse on

public interest took over as a defence for breach of confidence [See

Lion Laboratories v. Evans, [1985] QB 526]. It would be

necessary to quote Lord Goff in Her Majesty’s Attorney General

v. The Observer Ltd. & Ors., [1991] AC 109, wherein he noted

that “it is now clear that the principle [of iniquity] extends to

matters of which disclosure is required in public interest”