filing a delayed complaint case, suppressing material facts, and utilising fresh proceedings to materially improve on his earlier version, in totality, amounts to gross abuse of the process of court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 283   OF 2021

(arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6432/2020)

KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA & ORS. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR.  RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.3.6 Being unsatisfied with the allegations made and charge sheet

filed against him, the Respondent No. 2 instituted a fresh private

complaint against the Appellants under Section 200 of CrPC in

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Complaint Case No. 2943 of 2018 in respect of the very incident

that took place on 5.08.2012. This private complaint was filed

only on 11.05.2018, that is about six years from the date of

alleged   incident.   In   the   private   complaint,   not   only   new

allegations were added but all allegations are wilder and different

from   the   averments   made   in   NCR   No.   158/12,   though   the

incident  is the  same  as of  5.08.2012  and between  the same

parties. It may not be necessary for us to narrate the contents of

the private complaint inasmuch as we find and have satisfied

ourselves that the allegations made in the private complaint are

absolute material improvements over the allegations in NCR No.

158/12.   Among   other   things,   not   only   three   additional   eye

witnesses are inducted in the private complaint, but allegations

of fraud, injury to bull, forging of affidavit,  etc. which were not

found   in   the   2012   complaint   are   also   found   in   the   private

complaint.   The   private   complaint   for   the   first   time   mentions

commission of offences under Section 429, IPC and Sections 10

and 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. It is an

admitted   fact   that   Appellant   No.   4   had   inflicted   injury   on

Respondent No. 2s bull on 26.09.2011, for which Appellant No. 4

had voluntarily confessed and accepted penalty of Rs. 1,500 from

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the Magistrate as mentioned supra. Be that as it may, we see no

reason why Respondent No. 2 chose to rehash this incident in

the private complaint given that Appellant No. 4 has already been

convicted for the offence, and it is of no relevance to the present

case.

Curiously,   the   Magistrate   was   pleased   to   issue   process

against the Appellants based on this vexatious private complaint,

which came to be confirmed by the Learned Sessions Judge in

the impugned order. The Learned Sessions Judge has thus not

only misunderstood Section 200, CrPC and its scope but also

made   a   new   case   in   favour   of   Respondent   No.2   by   reading

Section 506 Part II, IPC which is punishable by 7 years in the

place of Section 506, IPC, probably only to bring the private

complaint   within   the   prescribed   period   of   limitation   under

Section 468 CrPC.   It is nobodys case that the offence under

Section 506(II) has taken place, which means that the Courts

took   extra   interest   to   improve   the   case   of   the

respondent/complainant. 

This   appeal   is   filed   challenging   both   the   orders   of   the

Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in respect of issuance of

process, as mentioned supra. 

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4.  The learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 sought to justify

the impugned orders by relying on the following excerpt from this

Courts decision in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash & ors., (2004)

13 SCC 292, which clarified the import of its previous holding in

T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181: 

23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this

Court in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001

SCC (Cri) 1048] is to be accepted as holding that a

second complaint in regard to the same incident filed

as a counter­complaint is prohibited under the Code

then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to

serious   consequences.   This   will   be   clear   from   the

hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard

to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the

first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the

same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the

aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from

lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in

question,   consequently   he   will   be   deprived   of   his

legitimated right to bring the real accused to book.

This cannot be the purport of the Code.

Therefore, Upkar Singh clarified that this Courts previous

decision in  T.T.   Anthony  will not bar the  filing of  a  second

complaint   with   respect   to   the   same   incident,   if   such   second

complaint is filed as a counter­complaint by the other party. We

are in agreement with  the aforementioned  construction of  T.T.

Anthony. However, we fail to see how this position of law comes

to Respondent No.2s rescue. The question posed in the present

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case for consideration before us is wholly different, and concerns

the validity of the private complaint filed by Respondent No. 2,

after an earlier information filed as NCR No. 158/2012  both of

which were filed by the same party, against the same accused,

and in relation to the same incident that too after the charge

sheet was filed in case arising out of NCR No. 160/12 in Crime

No. 283/2017 after taking due permission of Magistrate. The

aforementioned portion of Upkar Singh relied on by Respondent

No. 2, thus, does not benefit his case. 

5. Indeed, a closer look at the decision in Upkar Singh takes us

to the contrary conclusion. In regard to the question of material

improvements made in a subsequent private complaint by the

same complainant against the same accused with regard to the

same incident, it may be useful to refer to the following excerpt

from  Upkar  Singh,  which further clarifies the holding in  T.T.

Antony: 

17In our opinion, this Court in that case only held

that any further complaint by the same complainant or

others against the same accused, subsequent to the

registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code

because  an  investigation   in  this  regard  would  have

already   started   and  further   complaint   against   the

same accused will amount to an improvement on the

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facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will

be   prohibited   under   Section   162   of   the   Code.

(emphasis supplied)

It is the aforementioned part of the holding in Upkar Singh

that   bears  directly  and   strongly  upon   the   present   case.   This

Court   in  Upkar   Singh  has   clearly   stated   that   any   further

complaint by the same complainant against the same accused,

after the case has already been registered, will be deemed to be

an   improvement   from   the   original   complaint.   Though  Upkar

Singh was rendered in the context of a case involving cognizable

offences, the same principle would also apply where a person

gives information of a non­cognizable offence and subsequently

lodges   a   private   complaint   with   respect   to   the   same   offence

against the same accused person. Even in a non­cognizable case,

the police officer after the order of the Magistrate, is empowered

to investigate the offence in the same manner as a cognizable

case, except the power to arrest without a warrant. Therefore, the

complainant cannot subject the accused to a double whammy of

investigation by the police and inquiry before the Magistrate. 

We are cognizant of the fact that in the present case, no

investigation had begun pursuant to NCR No. 158/2012 filed by

the Respondent No. 2 for a certain period. However, the overall

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concern expressed by this Court in  Upkar   Singh, about the

misuse of successive complaints by the same party, where the

second complaint is clearly propped up to materially improve on

the earlier one, resonates with us. We regret to say that the same

thing which this Court had categorically prohibited in  Upkar

Singh has happened in the present case. 

6.   The   grave   implications   of   allowing   such   misuse   may   be

understood   better   in   light   of   the   following   exposition   by   this

Court in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah  v.  CBI & anr.,  (2013) 6

SCC 348: 

37. This Court has consistently laid down the law on

the issue interpreting the Code, that a second FIR in

respect of an offence or different offences committed in

the   course   of   the   same   transaction   is   not   only

impermissible   but   it   violates   Article   21   of   the

Constitution. In T.T. Antony [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001

SCC (Cri) 1048] , this Court has categorically held that

registration of second FIR (which is not a cross­case) is

violative of Article 21 of the Constitution (emphasis

supplied)

Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that the right to

life and liberty shall not be taken away except by due process of

law. Permitting multiple complaints by the same party in respect

of the same incident, whether it involves a cognizable or private

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complaint offence, will lead to the accused being entangled in

numerous criminal proceedings. As such, he would be forced to

keep surrendering his liberty and precious time before the police

and the Courts, as and when required in each case. As this Court

has   held   in  Amitbhai   Anilchandra   Shah  (supra),   such   an

absurd and mischievous interpretation of the provisions of the

CrPC   will   not   stand   the   test   of   constitutional   scrutiny,   and

therefore cannot be adopted by us. 

7. The implications of such successive FIRs on an individuals

rights under Article 21 of the Constitution has been elaborated

further in T.T. Antony (supra): 

27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of

the   citizens   under   Articles   19   and   21   of   the

Constitution and the expansive power of the police to

investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the

court.   There   cannot   be   any   controversy   that   subsection (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to

make   further   investigation,   obtain   further   evidence

(both oral  and  documentary)  and forward a  further

report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case

[Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 2 SCC

322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed

that   it   would   be   appropriate   to   conduct   further

investigation   with   the   permission   of   the   court.

However, the sweeping power of investigation does not

warrant   subjecting   a   citizen   each   time   to   fresh

investigation   by   the   police   in   respect   of   the   same

incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences,

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consequent   upon   filing   of   successive   FIRs   whether

before   or   after   filing   the   final   report   under   Section

173(2) CrPC 

(emphasis supplied)

Thus,   it   is   incumbent   upon   this   Court   to   preserve   this

delicate balance between the power to investigate offences under

the CrPC, and the fundamental right of the individual to be free

from frivolous and repetitive criminal prosecutions forced upon

him by the might of the State. If the Respondent No. 2 was

aggrieved by lack of speedy investigation in the earlier case filed

by him, the appropriate remedy would have been to apply to the

Magistrate under Section 155(2), CrPC for directions to the police

in this regard. Filing a private complaint without any prelude,

after a gap of six years from the date of giving information to the

police, smacks of mala fide on the part of Respondent No. 2.

....

9. It is also pertinent to note that as on 5.08.2012, Appellant

No.1 was a 76­year­old man; Appellant No.2 was suffering from

epileptic seizures; and Appellant No. 4 was of unsound mind.

There is no equity in allowing them to be dragged into criminal

proceedings pertaining to a petty offence, instituted 6 years after

the alleged incident. The sword of Damocles cannot be allowed to

forever hang on their heads, falling unpredictably at the whims of

a   litigant   seeking   to   harass   and   persecute   at   will.   We   gain

14

strength in our conclusions from Article 21 of the Constitution,

which encapsulates the right to a speedy trial. This right has

been interpreted to include not only the actual trial before the

Court,   but   also   the   preceding   stages   of   inquiry   and   police

investigation as well  (Vakil  Prasad  Singh  v.  State  of  Bihar,

(2009) 3 SCC 355; Abdul   Rehman   Antulay  &   ors.  v.  R.S.

Nayak & anr., (1992) 1 SCC 225).

10.  The sum of the above circumstances and precedents leads

us to what we see as an inevitable conclusion. That Respondent

No. 2s institution of the fresh complaint case in 2018 under

Section   200   CrPC   was   a   concerted   effort   to   mislead   the

Magistrate with the oblique motive of harassing the Appellants

with a frivolous and vexatious case against them. That the same

was a counter­blast to the charge sheet dated 17.09.2017 filed

against Respondent No. 2 and his wife in the case registered by

the   Appellant.   The   history   of   ill­will   and   malice   between   the

parties leads further credence to Respondent No.2s motivations

for tying up the Appellants in frivolous and harrowing criminal

litigation, long years after the alleged incident. Respondent No.2s

conduct in filing a delayed complaint case, suppressing material

15

facts, and utilising fresh proceedings to materially improve on his

earlier version, in totality, amounts to gross abuse of the process

of court.