JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA VERSUS SUBHASH CHANDRA AGARWAL , CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10044 OF 2010 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 1.    FACTS
9.    The case involves three appeals which arose from separate orders denying access to information under the RTI Act. Through the first of the appeals, respondent sought the complete correspondence of the Chief Justice of India regarding an alleged attempt to influence a judicial decision. The second appeal involved an RTI application request to furnish a copy of documents available with the Supreme Court. This included a correspondence between the relevant constitutional authorities relating to the appointment of various Supreme Court judges. The third appeal involved an RTI application seeking information on a declaration made by judges to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices in the States regarding the assets held by them, their spouses or any person dependent on them.
2.    DECISION OVERVIEW
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
10.    To understand the meaning of fiduciary relationship under section 8(1)(e), the Court referred to Aditya Bandopadhyay case. The court in the case had observed that the expression is used in its normal and well-recognised sense, that is, to refer to persons who act in a fiduciary capacity, with reference to a specific beneficiary or beneficiaries who are to be expected to be protected or benefited by the actions of the fiduciary. [p. 41] The Court concluded that the exemption under section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act does not apply to beneficiaries regarding whom the fiduciary holds information.

11.    Thereafter, the Court referred to the RBI case, in which the court highlighted four principles required to classify a relationship as a fiduciary relationship. These are: (1) no conflict rule; (2) no profit rule; (3) undivided loyalty rule, and; (4) duty of confidentiality. The court observed that the fiduciary relationship casts positive obligations on the fiduciary and requires it to protect the interests of the beneficiary. Accordingly, obligations of the fiduciary are stricter than non-fiduciary relationships and the judicial scrutiny is higher.

12.    The Court held that the relationship between the Chief Justice and judges is not generally that of a fiduciary and a beneficiary. However, it is not an absolute rule as in certain situations and acts, a fiduciary relationship may arise. Whether or not such a relationship arises in a particular situation would have to be dealt with based on the tests and parameters expressed above.
MEANING OF PUBLIC INTEREST
13.    The Court observed that the public interest test often applied in the right to information legislation to balance right to access and protection of the conflicting right to deny access. Section 8(1)(j) and Section 11 also require balancing of competing public interests. The Court noted that the test prescribed in Section 8(1)(j) is broader than the one in Section 11, as the latter requires comparison between disclosure of information relating to a third person or information supplied and treated as confidential by the third party and possible harm or injury to the third party on disclosure, which would include all kinds of possible harm and injury to the third party on disclosure.
14.    For the purpose of understanding public interest in the context of the RTI Act, the Court relied on a Supreme Court judgment (Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and Another, (2012) 13 SCC 61) for it to mean the general welfare of the public warranting the disclosure and the protection applicable, in which the public as a whole has a stake. Differentiating between information in public interest and information which is of interest to the public, the Court held that the public interest test in the context of the RTI Act would mean reflecting upon the object and purpose behind the right to information, the right to privacy and consequences of invasion, and breach of confidentiality and possible harm and injury that would be caused to the third party, with reference to particular information and the person.
15.    The Court also observed that the Act does not specify factors which should be taken into consideration for determining public interest. To determine these factors, the Court referred to an article published in the Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal (Freedom of Information and the Public Interest: the Commonwealth experience). The article determined that there are certain factors which weigh in favor of disclosure (accountability of officials, openness in the expenditure of public funds, the performance by a public authority of its regulatory functions, public health and safety, etc.), some against (the likelihood of damage to security or international relations, the likelihood of damage to the integrity or viability of decision-making processes, etc.), and lastly those which are irrelevant (the information might be misunderstood, embarrassing, that the requested information is overly technical in nature, etc.).
16.    The last aspect in the public interest test which the Court suggested may factor in is the motive and purpose for making the request for information. In the words of the Court:
Clearly, motive and purpose for making the request for information is irrelevant, and being extraneous cannot be a ground for refusing the information. However, this is not to state that motive and purpose may not be relevant factor while applying the public interest test in case of qualified exemptions governed by the public interest test Similarly, in other cases, public interest may weigh in favour of the disclosure when the information sought may be of special interest or special significance to the applicant. It could equally be a negative factor when the motive and purpose is vexatious or it is a case of clear abuse of law. [p. 79]

NEED FOR REASONED ORDER
17.    When rendering a decision, the Public Information Officers must clearly state their reasoning. Accordingly, the Court held:
The delicate balance requires identification of public interest behind each exemption and then cumulatively weighing the public interest in accepting or maintaining the exemption(s) to deny information in a particular case against the public interest in disclosure in that particular case. Further, under Section 11(1), reference is made to the possible harm and injury to the third party which will also have to be factored in when determining disclosure of confidential information relating to the third parties. [p. 78]

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
81. Having dealt with the doctrine of the public interest under the RTI
Act, we would now turn to examining its co-relation with
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 93 of 108
transparency in the functioning of the judiciary in matters of
judicial appointments/selection and importance of judicial
independence.
82. Four major arguments are generally invoked to deny third-party or
public access to information on appointments/selection of judges,
namely, (i) confidentiality concerns; (ii) data protection; (ii)
reputation of those being considered in the selection process,
especially those whose candidature/eligibility stands negated; and
(iv) potential chilling effect on future candidates given the degree
of exposure and public scrutiny involved.52 These arguments have
become subject matter of considerable debate, if not outright
criticism at the hands of jurists and authors.53 Yet there are those
who have expressed cynicism about the interview process
undertaken by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) in
recommending judges for appointment in South Africa, by pointing
out the precariousness and the chilling effect it has on prospective
candidates and consequently the best candidates often do not
apply.54 Recently, the majority judgment of the Constitutional Court
52 See: How Transparent is Transparent Enough?: Balancing Access to Information Against Privacy
in European Judicial Selections by Alberto Alemanno in Michal Bobek (ed.), Selecting Europes
Judges, 2015 Edition.
53 Kate Malleson, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Supreme Court Nominees: A View from the United
Kingdom Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2007) 44, 557.
54 WH Gravett, Towards an algorithmic model of judicial appointment: The necessity for radical
revision of the Judicial Service Commissions interview procedures 2017 (80) THRHR.
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 94 of 108
of South Africa in Helen Suzman Foundation v. Judicial Service
Commission55 by relying upon Rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules
of Court, South Africa,
56 had directed the JSC to furnish the record
of its deliberations, rejecting the contrary argument of candour and
robustness as that of timorous fainthearts. Debating with
candour, the Court observed, is not equivalent to expression of
impropriety. The candidates, it was noticed, had undergone
gruelling scrutiny in the public interviews, and therefore disclosure
of deliberation would not act as a dampener for future candidates.
More importantly, the Constitutional Court had distinguished the
authority and power with the Courts under Rule 53 to access the
deliberation record, with the different right to access information
under the Promotion to Access to Information Act, 2000 (PAIA),
which was the basis of the minority judgment for rejection of
production of the JSCs deliberation record. The majority held that
PAIA and Rule 53 serve different purposes, there being a
55 Case 289/16 decided on 24th April 2018
56 Rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court, South Africa states:
(1) Save where any law otherwise provides, all proceedings to bring under review the decision or
proceedings of any inferior court and of any tribunal, board or officer performing judicial, quasijudicial or administrative functions shall be by way of notice of motion directed and delivered by
the party seeking to review such decision or proceedings to the magistrate, presiding officer or
chairman of the court, tribunal or board or to the officer, as the case may be, and to all other
parties affected-
(a) []
(b) calling upon the magistrate, presiding officer, chairman or officer, as the case may be, to
despatch, within fifteen days after receipt of the notice of motion, to the registrar the record
of such proceedings sought to be corrected or set aside, together with such reasons as he
is by law required or desires to give or make, and to notify the applicant that he has done
so.
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 95 of 108
difference in the nature of, and purposes, and therefore it would
be inapt to transpose PAIA proscriptions on access under Rule
53. The PAIA grants any person or busybody a right to access any
information without explaining whatsoever as to why she or he
requires the information. This had to be balanced, with the need to
incentivise people to furnish private information, where such
information is required for facilitating the government machinery,
and therefore, considerations of confidentiality are applied as the
person furnishing information must be made aware that the
information would not be unhesitatingly divulged to others,
including busybodies, for no particular reason. This facilitates the
exercise of power and performance of functions of the state
functionaries. In court matters under Rule 53, concerns of
confidentiality could be addressed by imposing stringent and
restrictive conditions on the right to access information, including
furnishing of confidentiality undertakings for restraining the
divulgence of details to third parties.
83. The United Kingdoms Data Protection Act, 2018 grants class
exemption to all personal data processed for the purpose of
assessing a persons suitability for judicial office, from certain
rights including the right of the data subject to be informed,
guaranteed under the European Union General Data Protection
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 96 of 108
Regulation being given effect to by the Data Protection Act.57
Similarly, in the context of the European Union, opinions of the
Article 255 Panel58 and the Advisory Panel59
, entrusted with the
task of advising on the suitability of candidates as judges to the
Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of
Human Rights are inaccessible to the public and their opinions
have limited circulation, as they are exclusively forwarded to the
representatives of governments of the member states in the case
of European Union60 and the individual governments in the case of
Council of Europe61
, respectively. The Council of the European
Union,62 for instance, in consultation with Article 255 Panel, has
denied requests for public access to opinions issued by the
Panel,63 in light of the applicable exceptions provided for in
Regulation No 1049/200164. Such opinions, the Council has
57 Schedule 2, Part-2, Paragraph 14.
58 Article 255, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states:
A panel shall be set up in order to give an opinion on candidates' suitability to perform the duties of
Judge and Advocate-General of the Court of Justice and the General Court before the governments
of the Member States make the appointments referred to in Articles 253 and 254
59 Set up under Resolution Establishment of an Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election
as Judge to the European Court of Human Rights, CM/Res (2010) 26 adopted by the Committee of
Ministers on 10 November 2010.
60 CJEU is the judicial branch of the European Union, administering justice in the 28 member states
of the international organisation.
61 Comprising of 47 member European states, Council of Europe adopted the European Convention
on Human Rights, which established ECtHR.
62 One of the seven constituent bodies of the European Union comprising of the ministers from the
member states of the European Union.
63 Reply Adopted by the Council on 12 July 2016 to Confirmatory Application 13/c/01/16 pursuant to
Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 for public access to all the opinions issued by the
Panel provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
64 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents
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observed, largely include personal data of the candidates, viz.
factual elements concerning the candidates professional
experience and qualifications and the Panels assessment of the
candidates competences and, therefore, access to relevant
documents is denied in order to protect the privacy and integrity of
the individual.65 However, a part of these opinions which do not
contain personal data and provide a description of the procedure
adopted and criteria applied by the Panel have been released as
Activity Reports in the framework of partial access to such
information. Opinions that are unfavourable to the appointment of
the candidates will be exempt from disclosure as they can hamper
commercial interests of the candidates in their capacity as legal
practitioners,66 whereas positive opinions are exempted from
disclosure as such opinions can lead to comparison and public
scrutiny of the most and least favoured qualities of the successful
candidates, potentially interfering with the proceedings of the
Court of Justice.67 Lastly, disclosure of opinions, the Council has
observed, will be exempted if such disclosure could seriously
65 Article 4(1)(b), Regulation No 1049/2001
66 First indent of Article 4(2), Regulation No 1049/2001
67 Second indent of Article 4(2), Regulation No 1049/2001
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undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there
is an overriding public interest in disclosure.68
84. More direct and relevant in the Indian context would be the
decision of this Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Association v. Union of India69, where a Constitutional Bench of
five judges had dealt with the constitutional validity of the National
Judicial Appointments Commission. A concurring judgment had
dealt with the aspect of transparency in appointment and transfer
of judges and the privacy concerns of the judges who divulge their
personal information in confidence, to opine as under:
949. In the context of confidentiality requirements, the
submission of the learned Attorney General was that
the functioning of NJAC would be completely
transparent. Justifying the need for transparency it was
submitted that so far the process of appointment of
Judges in the Collegium System has been extremely
secret in the sense that no one outside the Collegium
or the Department of Justice is aware of the
recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India
for appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court or
the High Courts. Reference was made
to Renu v. District & Sessions Judge, (2014) 14 SCC
50 to contend that in the matter of appointment in all
judicial institutions complete darkness in the
lighthouse has to be removed.
950. In addition to the issue of transparency a
submission was made that in the matter of appointment
of Judges, civil society has the right to know who is
being considered for appointment. In this regard, it was
68 Article 4(3), Regulation No 1049/2001
69 (2016) 5 SCC 1
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 99 of 108
held in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 that the people
have a right to know. Reliance was placed on Attorney
General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. 1974 AC 273: (1973)
3 WLR 298: (1973) 3 All ER 54 (HL) where the right to
know was recognised as a fundamental principle of the
freedom of expression and the freedom of discussion.
951. In State of U.P. v. Raj Narain (1975) 4 SCC 428 the
right to know was recognised as having been derived
from the concept of freedom of speech.
952. Finally, in Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Indian
Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd., (1988) 4 SCC
592 it was held that the right to know is a basic right
which citizens of a free country aspire in the broader
horizon of the right to live in this age in our land under
Article 21 of our Constitution.
953. The balance between transparency and
confidentiality is very delicate and if some sensitive
information about a particular person is made public, it
can have a far-reaching impact on his/her reputation and
dignity. The 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the
NJAC Act have not taken note of the privacy concerns of
an individual. This is important because it was submitted
by the learned Attorney General that the proceedings of
NJAC will be completely transparent and any one can
have access to information that is available with NJAC.
This is a rather sweeping generalisation which obviously
does not take into account the privacy of a person who
has been recommended for appointment, particularly as
a Judge of the High Court or in the first instance as a
Judge of the Supreme Court. The right to know is not a
fundamental right but at best it is an implicit fundamental
right and it is hedged in with the implicit fundamental
right to privacy that all people enjoy. The balance
between the two implied fundamental rights is difficult to
maintain, but the 99th Constitution Amendment Act and
the NJAC Act do not even attempt to consider, let alone
achieve that balance.
954. It is possible to argue that information voluntarily
supplied by a person who is recommended for
appointment as a Judge might not have a right to
privacy, but at the same time, since the information is
supplied in confidence, it is possible to argue that it
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 100 of 108
ought not to be disclosed to third party unconcerned
persons. Also, if the recommendation is not accepted
by the President, does the recommended person have
a right to non-disclosure of the adverse information
supplied by the President? These are difficult questions
to which adequate thought has not been given and
merely on the basis of a right to know, the reputation of
a person cannot be whitewashed in a dhobi-ghat.
85. Earlier, the Constitution Bench of nine judges had in Second
Judges Case, that is Supreme Court Advocates on Record
Association and Others v. Union of India70 overruled the
majority opinion in S.P. Gupta (supra) (the first Judges case) and
had provided for primacy to the role of the Chief Justice of India
and the collegium in the matters of appointment and transfer of
judges. Speaking on behalf of the majority, J.S. Verma, J., had
with regard to the justiciability of transfers, summarised the legal
position as under:
480. The primacy of the judiciary in the matter of
appointments and its determinative nature in transfers
introduces the judicial element in the process, and is
itself a sufficient justification for the absence of the
need for further judiciary review of those decisions,
which is ordinarily needed as a check against possible
executive excess or arbitrariness. Plurality of judges in
the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of
India, as indicated, is another inbuilt check against the
likelihood of arbitrariness or bias, even subconsciously,
of any individual. The judicial element being
predominant in the case of appointments, and decisive
in transfers, as indicated, the need for further judicial
review, as in other executive actions, is eliminated.
70 (1993) 4 SCC 441
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 101 of 108
The reduction of the area of discretion to the minimum,
the element of plurality of judges in formation of the
opinion of the Chief Justice of India, effective
consultation in writing, and prevailing norms to regulate
the area of discretion are sufficient checks against
arbitrariness.
481. These guidelines in the form of norms are not to
be construed as conferring any justiciable right in the
transferred Judge. Apart from the constitutional
requirement of a transfer being made only on the
recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, the issue
of transfer is not justiciable on any other ground,
including the reasons for the transfer or their
sufficiency. The opinion of the Chief Justice of India
formed in the manner indicated is sufficient safeguard
and protection against any arbitrariness or bias, as well
as any erosion of the independence of the judiciary.
482. This is also in accord with the public interest of
excluding these appointments and transfers from
litigative debate, to avoid any erosion in the credibility
of the decisions, and to ensure a free and frank
expression of honest opinion by all the constitutional
functionaries, which is essential for effective
consultation and for taking the right decision. The
growing tendency of needless intrusion by strangers
and busy-bodies in the functioning of the judiciary
under the garb of public interest litigation, in spite of the
caution in S.P. Gupta which expanding the concept of
locus standi, was adverted to recently by a Constitution
Bench in Krishna Swami v. Union of India (1992) 4
SCC 605. It is therefore, necessary to spell out clearly
the limited scope of judicial review in such matters, t
avoid similar situations in future. Except on the ground
of want of consultation with the named constitutional
functionaries or lack of any condition of eligibility in the
cases of an appointment, or of a transfer being made
without the recommendation of the Chief Justice of
India, these matters are not justiciable on any other
ground, including that of bias, which in any case is
excluded by the element of plurality in the process of
decision-making.
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 102 of 108
86. That the independence of the judiciary forms part of our basic
structure is now well established. S. P. Gupta (supra) (the first
Judges case) had observed that this independence is one
amongst the many other principles that run through the entire
fabric of the Constitution and is a part of the rule of law under the
Constitution. The judiciary is entrusted with the task of keeping the
other two organs within the limits of law and to make the rule of
law meaningful and effective. Further, the independence of
judiciary is not limited to judicial appointments to the Supreme
Court and the High Courts, as it is a much wider concept which
takes within its sweep independence from many other pressures
and prejudices. It consists of many dimensions including
fearlessness from other power centres, social, economic and
political, freedom from prejudices acquired and nurtured by the
class to which the judges belong and the like. This wider concept
of independence of judiciary finds mention in C. Ravichandran
Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and Others71
, High Court of
Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil72 and Jasbir
Singh v. State of Punjab73
.
71 (1995) 5 SCC 457
72 (1997) 6 SCC 339
73 (2006) 8 SCC 294
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 103 of 108
87. In Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (2016)
(supra) on the aspect of the independence of the judiciary, it has
been observed:
713. What are the attributes of an independent
judiciary? It is impossible to define them, except
illustratively. At this stage, it is worth recalling the
words of Sir Ninian Stephen, a former Judge of the
High Court of Australia who memorably said:
[An] independent judiciary, although a formidable
protector of individual liberty, is at the same time a very
vulnerable institution, a fragile bastion indeed.
It is this fragile bastion that needs protection to maintain
its independence and if this fragile bastion is subject to a
challenge, constitutional protection is necessary.
714. The independence of the judiciary takes within its
fold two broad concepts: (1) Independence of an
individual Judge, that is, decisional independence; and
(2) Independence of the judiciary as an institution or an
organ of the State, that is, functional independence. In a
lecture on Judicial Independence, Lord Phillips said:
In order to be impartial a Judge must be
independent; personally independent, that is free
of personal pressures and institutionally
independent, that is free of pressure from the
State.
 xx xx xx
726. Generally speaking, therefore, the independence
of the judiciary is manifested in the ability of a Judge to
take a decision independent of any external (or
internal) pressure or fear of any external (or internal)
pressure and that is decisional independence. It is
also manifested in the ability of the institution to have
functional independence. A comprehensive and
composite definition of independence of the judiciary
is elusive but it is easy to perceive.
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 104 of 108
It is clear from the aforesaid quoted passages that the
independence of the judiciary refers to both decisional and
functional independence. There is reference to a report titled
Judicial Independence: Law and Practice of Appointments to the
European Court of Human Rights74 which had observed that
judges are not elected by the people (relevant in the context of
India and the United Kingdom) and, therefore, derive their
authority and legitimacy from their independence from political or
other interference.
88. We have referred to the decisions and viewpoints to highlight the
contentious nature of the issue of transparency, accountability and
judicial independence with various arguments and counterarguments on both sides, each of which commands merit and
cannot be ignored. Therefore, it is necessary that the question of
judicial independence is accounted for in the balancing exercise. It
cannot be doubted and debated that the independence of the
judiciary is a matter of ennobled public concern and directly
relates to public welfare and would be one of the factors to be
74 Contributors: Professor Dr. Jutta Limbach, Professor Dr. Pedro Villalon, Roger Errera, The Rt Hon
Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, Professor Dr. Tamara Morschakova, The Rt Hon Lord Justice Sedley,
Professor Dr. Andrzej Zoll. <http://www.interights.org/document/142/index.html>
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 105 of 108
taken into account in weighing and applying the public interest
test. Thus, when the public interest demands the disclosure of
information, judicial independence has to be kept in mind while
deciding the question of exercise of discretion. However, we
should not be understood to mean that the independence of the
judiciary can be achieved only by denial of access to information.
Independence in a given case may well demand openness and
transparency by furnishing the information. Reference to the
principle of judicial independence is not to undermine and avoid
accountability which is an aspect we perceive and believe has to
be taken into account while examining the public interest in favour
of disclosure of information. Judicial independence and
accountability go hand in hand as accountability ensures, and is a
facet of judicial independence. Further, while applying the
proportionality test, the type and nature of the information is a
relevant factor. Distinction must be drawn between the final
opinion or resolutions passed by the collegium with regard to
appointment/elevation and transfer of judges with observations
and indicative reasons and the inputs/data or details which the
collegium had examined. The rigour of public interest in divulging
the input details, data and particulars of the candidate would be
different from that of divulging and furnishing details of the output,
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 106 of 108
that is the decision. In the former, public interest test would have
to be applied keeping in mind the fiduciary relationship (if it
arises), and also the invasion of the right to privacy and breach of
the duty of confidentiality owed to the candidate or the information
provider, resulting from the furnishing of such details and
particulars. The position represents a principled conflict between
various factors in favour of disclosure and those in favour of
withholding of information. Transparency and openness in judicial
appointments juxtaposed with confidentiality of deliberations
remain one of the most delicate and complex areas. Clearly, the
position is progressive as well as evolving as steps have been
taken to make the selection and appointment process more
transparent and open. Notably, there has been a change after
concerns were expressed on disclosure of the names and the
reasons for those who had not been approved. The position will
keep forging new paths by taking into consideration the
experiences of the past and the aspirations of the future.
Questions referred to the Constitution Bench are accordingly
answered, observing that it is not possible to answer these
questions in absolute terms, and that in each case, the public
interest test would be applied to weigh the scales and on balance
determine whether information should be furnished or would be
Civil Appeal No. 10044 of 2010 & Ors. Page 107 of 108
exempt. Therefore, a universal affirmative or negative answer is
not possible. However, independence of judiciary is a matter of
public interest.