Government (Liability in Torts)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 113 OF 2016

KAUSHAL KISHOR                                             … PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION @ (DIARY) NO. 34629 OF 2017

J U D G M E N T

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.

 

3. Thereafter,   the   Constitution   Bench,   by   an   order   dated

24.10.2019, formulated the following five questions to be decided by

this Court:­

“…....

3) Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively

protect the rights of a citizen under Article 21 of the

Constitution   of   India   even   against   a   threat   to   the

liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another

citizen or private agency? 

4) Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to

any affairs of State or for protecting the Government,

be   attributed   vicariously   to   the   Government   itself,

especially   in   view   of   the   principle   of   Collective

Responsibility? 

5) Whether a statement  by a  Minister, inconsistent

with the rights of a citizen under Part Three of the

Constitution,   constitutes   a   violation   of   such

constitutional   rights   and   is   actionable   as

‘Constitutional Tort”? …”

 

.....

141.  A tort is a civil wrong, that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act. Halsbury’s Law of England states: “Those civil rights of action which are available for the recovery of unliquidated damages by persons who have sustained injury or loss from acts, statements or omissions of others in breach of duty or contravention of right imposed or conferred by law rather than by agreement are rights of

action in tort.”

142.  If Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 changed the course of the law relating   to   tort   in   England,   the   Federal   Tort   Claims   Act,   1946 changed in America, the course of law relating to the liability of the State for the tortious acts of its servants. Nevertheless, the claims for damages continued to be resisted for a long time both here and elsewhere on the principle of sovereign immunity. It is interesting to note that on the initiative of the President of India, the Law Ministry took up for consideration the question whether legislation on the lines of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 of the United Kingdom is needed and if so, to what extent.  After the constitution of the Law Commission,   the   Law   Ministry   referred   the   matter   to   the Commission   for   consideration   and   report.   In   its   First   Report submitted on 11.5.1956 on “Liability of the State in Tort”, the Law Commission took note of  (i)  the existing law in India;  (ii)  law in England; (iii) law in America; (iv) law in Australia; (v) law in France; (vi)  rule   of   statutory   construction;   and  (vii)  conclusions   and proposals.

143.  In Chapter VIII containing the conclusions and proposals, the First   Report   of   the   Law   Commission   suggested:  (i)  that   in   the context of a welfare State, it is necessary to establish a just relation between the rights of the individual and the responsibilities of the State; (ii)  that when the Constitution was framed, the question to what extent, if any, the Union and the States should be made liable for the tortious acts of their servants or agents was left for future legislation;  (iii)  that the question of demarcating the line up to which the State should be made liable for the tortious acts, involves a nice balancing of considerations, so as not to unduly restrict the sphere of the activities of the State and at the same time to afford sufficient protection to the citizen; (iv)  that it is necessary that the law should, as far as possible, be made certain and definite, instead of leaving it to courts to develop the law according to the views of the judges; and (v)  that the old distinction between sovereign and the   non­sovereign   functions   or   Governmental   and   the   nonGovernmental functions should no longer be invoked to determine the liability of the State.

144.    Paragraph 66 of the First Report of the Law Commission contained the principles on which appropriate legislation should proceed.  It will be useful to extract paragraph 66 of the First Report of the Law Commission, to understand the sweep of constitutional tort, as it was conceived within a few years of the adoption of the Constitution. In fact, it has laid down the road map very clearly with lot of foresight. Paragraph 66 reads thus: “66. The following shall be the principles on which legislation should proceed:—

I. Under the general law:

Under the general law of torts i.e., the English Common Law as imported into India on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience, with statutory modifications of that law now in force in India (vide the Principles of General Law, Appendix VI)—

(i) The State as employer should be liable for the torts committed by its employees and agents   while   acting   within   the   scope   of   their office or, employment.

(ii) The State as employer should be liable in   respect   of   breach   of   those   duties   which   a person owes to his employees or agents under the   general   law   by   reason   of   being   their employer.

(iii) The  State should  be  liable  for torts committed by an independent contractor only in cases referred to in Appendix VI.

(iv) The State also should be liable for torts where a corporation owned or controlled by the State would be liable.

(v) The State should be liable in respect of breach of duties attached under the general law to   the   ownership,   occupation,   possession   or control of immoveable properly from the moment the   State   occupies   or   takes   possession   or assumes control of the property.

(vi)   The   State   should   be   subject   to   the general   law   liability   for   injury   caused   by dangerous things (chattels). In respect of (i) to (vi) the State should be entitled to raise   the   same   defences,   which   a   citizen   would   be entitled to raise under general law.

II. In respect of duties of care imposed by statute:

(i) If a statute authorises the doing of an act which is in itself injurious, the State should not be liable.

(ii)   The   State   should   be   liable,   without proof   of   negligence,   for   breach   of   a   statutory duty   imposed   on   it   or   its   employees   which causes damage.

(iii) The State should be liable if in the discharge of statutory duties imposed upon it or its employees, the employees act negligently or maliciously, whether or not discretion is involved in the exercise of such duty.

(iv) The State should be liable if in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it or its employees the power is so exercised as to cause nuisance or trespass or the power is exercised negligently or maliciously causing damage.

N.B.—Appendix V shows some of the Acts which contain protection clauses. But under the General Clauses Act a thing is deemed to be done in good faith even if it is done negligently. Therefore, by suitable legislation the protection should be made not to extend to negligent acts however honestly done and for this purpose the relevant clauses in such enactments should be examined.

(v)   The   State   should   be   subject   to   the same duties and should have the same rights as a private employer under a statute, whether it is specifically binding on the State or not.

(vi)   If   an   Act   negatives   or   limits   the compensation payable to a citizen who suffered damage, coming within the scope of the Act, the liability   of   the   State   should   be   the   same   as under that Act and the injured person should be entitled   only   to   the   remedy,   if   any,   provided under the Act.

III. Miscellaneous:

Patents, Designs and Copyrights: The provisions of   Sec.   3   of   the   Crown   Proceedings   Act   may   be

adopted.

IV. General Provisions:

(i)  Indemnity and contribution: To enable the State to claim indemnity or contribution, a provision on the lines of Sec. 4 of the Crown Proceedings Act may be adopted.

(ii)  Contributory   negligence:  In   England, the   Law   Reform   (Contributory   Negligence) Act,1945 was enacted amending the law relating to  contributory  negligence   and   in  view   of   the provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act the said Act also binds the Crown. In India, the trend of judicial opinion is in favour of holding that the rule in Merryweather v. Nixan [(1799) 8 T.R. 186] does   not   apply   and   that   there   is   no   legal impediment   to   one   tortfeasor   recovering compensation   from   another. But the law should not be left in an uncertain state and there should be legislation on the lines of the English Act.

(iii) Appropriate provision should be made while revising the Civil Procedure Code to make it  obligatory to implead as party to a suit in which a claim for damages against the State is made,   the   employee,   agent   or   independent contractor for whose act the State is sought to be   made   liable.     Any   claim   based on indemnity or contribution by the State may also   be   settled   in  such  proceeding   as  all  the parties will be before the court.

V. Exceptions:

(i)Acts   of   State:   The   defence   of   “Act   of State” should be made available to the State for any   act,   neglect   or   default   of   its   servants   or agents.     “Act   of   State”   means   an   act   of   the sovereign   power   directed   against   another sovereign   power   or   the   subjects   of   another sovereign   power   not   owning   temporary allegiance, in pursuance of sovereign rights.

(ii)  Judicial acts and execution of judicial process:The   State   shall   not   be   liable   for   acts done by judicial officers and persons executing warrants   and   orders   of   judicial  officers   in  all cases where protection is given to such officers and persons by Sec. 1 of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850.

(iii)  Acts done in the  exercise of political functions of the State such as acts relating to:

(a) Foreign Affairs (entry 10, List I, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution);

(b) Diplomatic, Consular and trade representation (entry 11);

(c)   United   Nations Organisation(entry 12);

(d)Participation   in   international conferences, associations and other bodies and   implementing   of   decisions   made

thereat (entry 13);

(e) entering   into   treaties   and agreements   with   foreign   countries   and implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries (entry14);

(f) war and peace (entry 15);

(g) foreign jurisdiction (entry 16);

(h) anything   done   by   the President, Governor or Rajpramukh in the exercise of the following functions: Power   of   summoning,   proroguing and dissolving the Legislature, vetoing of laws and anything done by the President in   the   exercise   of   the   powers   to   issue Proclamations under the Constitution;

(i) Acts done under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 1947;

(j) Acts done or omitted to be done under a Proclamation of Emergency when the security of the State is threatened.

(iv) Acts done in relation to the Defence Forces: (a) Combatant   activities   of   the Armed Forces during the time of war; (b)  Acts   done   in  the   exercise  of the  powers   vested   in   the   Union   for   the purpose   of   training   or   maintaining   the efficiency of the Defence Forces;

The   statutes   relating   to   these already   provide   for   payment   of compensation   and   the   machinery   for determining   the   compensation:  See Manoeuvres,   Field   Firing   and   Artillery Practice   Act,   1948;   Seaward   Artillery Practice Act, 1949;

(c)   The   liability   of   the   State   for personal   injury   or   death   caused   by   a member of the Armed Forces to another member while on duty shall be restricted in the same manner as in England (Sec. 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act)

(v) Miscellaneous:

(a)   any   claim   arising   out   of defamation,   malicious   prosecution   and malicious arrest,

(b)   any   claim   arising   out   of   the operation of quarantine law,

(c)   existing   immunity   under   the Indian   Telegraph   Act,   1885   and   Indian Post Offices Act, 1898,

(d)   foreign   torts.   (The   English provision may be adopted.)”

145.    It   appears   that   based   on   the   First   Report   of   the   Law Commission, a Bill known as the Government (Liability in Torts) Bill was introduced in 1967, but the same did not become the law. As a consequence, a huge burden was cast on the Courts to develop the law through judicial precedents, some of which we shall see now.

146.   The judicial journey actually started off on a right note with the decision in  The  State  of  Bihar  vs.  Abdul  Majid112, where a Government servant who was dismissed but later reinstated, filed a suit for recovery of arrears of salary. Though the State raised a defence on the basis of the doctrine of pleasure, this Court rejected the same on the ground that said doctrine based on the Latin 

167

phrase “durante bene placito” (during pleasure) has no application

in India. This decision was followed in State of Rajasthan vs. Mst.

Vidhyawati113

,  which involved a claim for compensation by the

widow of a person who was fatally knocked down by a jeep owned

and   maintained   by   the   State.   When   sovereign   immunity   was

pleaded, this Court observed in  Vidhyawati  (supra):  “when   the

rule  of   immunity   in  favour  of  the  Crown,  based  on  common

law in the United Kingdom has disappeared from the land of

its birth, there is no legal warrant for holding that it has any

validity in this country, particularly after the Constitution.”

147.   On the question of the liability of the State, for the tortious

acts of its servants, this Court opined in Vidhyawati, as follows:

“(10) This case also meets the second branch of the

argument   that   the   State   cannot   be   liable   for   the

tortious acts of its servants, when such servants are

engaged on an activity connected with the affairs of the

State. In this connection it has to be remembered that

under the Constitution we have established a welfare

state,   whose   functions   are   not   confined   only   to

maintaining law and order, but extend to engaging in

all activities including industry, public transport, state

trading, to name only a few of them. …”

113 AIR 1962 SC 933

168

148.    But   despite   the   decisions   in  Abdul   Majid  (supra)  and

Vidhyawati, this Court fell into a slippery slope in Kasturi Lal. It

was a case where the partner of a firm dealing in bullion and other

goods was arrested and detained in police custody and the gold and

silver that he was carrying was seized by the police. When he was

released later, the silver was returned but the Head Constable who

effected   the   arrest   misappropriated   the   gold   and   fled   away   to

Pakistan   in   October,   1947.   The   suit   filed   by  Kasturi   Lal  for

recovery of the value of the gold, was resisted on the ground that

this was not a case of negligence of the servants of the State and

that even if negligence was held proved against the police officers

the State could not be held liable. While upholding the contention of

the State, this Court said “if a tortious act is committed by a public

servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask

is: was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge

of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based

on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public

servant? If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages

for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie.  On the other hand, if

169

the tortious act has been committed by a public servant in discharge

of duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any

sovereign power, an action for damages would lie.  The act of the

public servant committed by him during the course of his employment

is in this category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been

employed by a private individual for the same purpose.”

149.    In fact, it was suggested by this Court in Kasturi Lal  that

the   Legislatures   in   India   should   seriously   consider   making

legislative   enactments   to   regulate   and   control   their   claim   for

immunity.   Before   proceeding   further   with   the   journey   in   the

chronological sequence, it must be mentioned that the decision in

Kasturi Lal was diluted to some extent after nearly 30 years which

we shall take note of at the appropriate stage.

150.    In  Khatri   (II)  vs.  State   of   Bihar.114, which came to  be

popularly known as Bhagalpur blinding case, this Court was dealing

with a brutal incident of Police atrocity which resulted in twentyfour prisoners being blinded. Though an opportunity was provided

114 (1981) 1 SCC 627

170

to this Court to signal the arrival of Constitutional tort in the said

case   and   though   the   petitioners   sought   compensation   for   the

violation of their Article 21 right, this Court simply postponed the

decision to a future date by holding that they are issues of the

gravest Constitutional importance, involving the exploration of new

dimension of the right to life and personal liberty.

151.   But within a couple of years, another opportunity arose in

Rudul  Sah  (supra), which related to the unlawful detention of a

prisoner for fourteen years even after his acquittal. This shook the

conscience   of   this   Court.   Therefore,   this   Court   awarded

compensation in an arbitrary sum of money, even while reserving

the right of the petitioner to bring a suit for recovery of appropriate

damages. This Court said that the order of compensation passed by

this Court was in the nature of palliative. When it is suggested by

the State that the appropriate remedy would be only to file a suit for

damages,   this   Court   said   that   by   refusing   to   order   anything

(towards compensation), this Court would be doing mere lip­service

to the fundamental right to liberty and that one of the telling ways

171

in which the violation of the right by the State can be reasonably

prevented, is to mulct its violators with monetary compensation.

152.    After  Rudul   Sah, there was no looking back.   Instead of

providing elaborate details, we think it is sufficient to provide in a

tabular   form,   details   of   the   cases   where   this   Court   awarded

compensation in public law, invoking the principle of constitutional

tort, either expressly or impliedly. 

Sr. 

No.

Case Laws Decision

1. Sebastian   M.Hongray  vs.

Union of India 

(1984) 3 SCC 82

 Two men who were taken for questioning

by   21st   Sikh   Regiment   never   returned

home.

 When a writ of habeas corpus was filed

by   a   JNU   student,   this   Court   directed

that the missing men be produced before

the   Court.   This   order   could   not   be

complied with.

 Court awarded compensation of Rs.1lac

to   the   wives   of   the   missing   men   on

account   of   mental   agony   suffered   by

them.

2. Bhim   Singh,   MLA  vs.  State

of J&K.

(1985) 4 SCC 677

 An   MLA   was   illegally   arrested   and

detained to prevent him from attending a

session of the Jammu & Kashmir State

Legislative Assembly.

 FIR   was   registered   u/s   153A,   IPC  and

order of remand was obtained from the

Magistrate   without   producing   the   MLA

before Court.

 In a writ for habeas corpus filed by his

wife, this Court observed that there had

been a violation of his fundamental rights

under   Articles   21   and   22(2)   of   the

Constitution and accordingly directed the

State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir   to   pay

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Bhim   Singh   a   sum   of   Rs.50,000/­   as

compensation. 

3. Peoples’   Union   for

Democratic  Rights  vs.  State

of Bihar &Ors.

(1987) 1 SCC 265

 A   public   interest   litigation   was   filed

against   the   illegal   shooting   by   police

officers   against   members   of   a   peaceful

assembly. 

 Several   were   injured   and   21   died

(including children) due to this incident.

 While the State had paid a compensation

of   Rs.10,000   each   to   heirs   of   the

deceased, this Court found it insufficient

and   directed   payment   of   Rs.20,000   to

dependants   of   each   deceased   and

Rs.5,000 to each injured person.

4. Saheli, a Women’s Resources

Centre   through   Ms.   Nalini

Bhanot   &   Ors.  vs.

Commissioner of Police, 

Delhi  Police  Headquarters &

Ors.

(1990) 1 SCC 422

 Two women were forcefully evicted from

their homes. The landlord was aided by

the SHO and SI in the assault that led to

demise of the nine­year­old son of one of

the women.

 This   Court   awarded   compensation   of

Rs.75,000 to the mother of the deceased

child.

5. Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid

Committee   through   its

Hony. Secretary  vs.  State of

Bihar & Ors.

(1991) 3 SCC 482

 A person injured in a train robbery, was

taken   to   the   nearest   hospital   by   the

Police by tying him to the footboard of a

vehicle. This led to his death.

 This Court observed that had timely care

been given to the victim he might have

been saved.

 The State of Bihar was directed to pay

Rs.20,000   to   the   legal   heirs   of   the

deceased.

6. Nilabati   Behera   (Smt.)   alias

Lalita   Behera   (Through   the

Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid

Committee)  vs.  State   of

Orissa & Ors.

(1993) 2 SCC 746

 Petitioner was a mother whose son had

died in police custody.

 This   Court   directed   the   State   to   pay

compensation of Rs.1.5 lacs.

7. Arvinder   Singh   Bagga  vs.

State of U.P. & Ors.

(1994) 6 SCC 565

 A   married   woman   was   detained   and

physically  assaulted   in   a  police   station

with a view to coerce her to implicate her

husband   and   his   family   in   a   case   of

abduction and forcible marriage.

 After taking her statement, her husband

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and his family were also harassed by the

police. 

 This Court observed that the police had

exhibited   high­handedness   and

uncivilized   behaviour   and   awarded   the

woman a compensation of Rs.10,000 and

members of her family Rs.5,000 each.

8. N.   Nagendra   Rao   &   Co.  vs.

State of A.P. 

(1994) 6 SCC 205

 Appellant   was   in   the   business   of   food

grains and fertiliser. On an inspection by

the   concerned   authorities,   his   stocks

were seized. 

 As was the practice, the food grains in

custody   were   sold   and   the   proceeds

deposited   in   the   Treasury,   but   the

fertilisers were not dealt with in the same

manner   causing   great   loss   to   the

Petitioner. 

 In a suit for negligence and misfeasance

of public authorities, this Court further

developed  the concept of Constitutional

Tort and limited the scope of sovereign

immunity   laid   down   in  Kasturilal.   The

State was held vicariously liable for the

actions of the authorities. 

9. Inder   Singh  vs.  State   of

Punjab & Ors.

(1995) 3 SCC 702

 A Deputy Superintendent of Police along

with   his   subordinates   abducted   and

killed   seven   persons   due   to   personal

vengeance.

 This   Court   ordered   an   inquiry   by   the

CBI.After  CBI  filed   a   report,   this  court

directed the State to pay Rs.1.5 lacs to

the legal heirs (to be recovered from guilty

policemen later) and State to pay costs

quantified at Rs.25,000.

10. Paschim   Banga   Khet

Mazdoor   Samity   &   Ors.  vs.

State of W.B. & Anr.

 (1996) 4 SCC 37

 The callous attitude on the part of the

medical   authorities   at   various

Government­run hospitals in Calcutta in

providing treatment  to  a  train  accident

victim was highlighted in this case.

 This   Court   directed   the   State   to   pay

Rs.25,000   for   the   denial   of   its

constitutional obligations of care.

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11. D.K. Basu vs. State of W.B.

(1997) 1 SCC 416

 In   a   public   interest   litigation   involving

incidents   of   custodial   violence   in   West

Bengal, this Court issued guidelines for

law enforcement agencies to follow when

arresting and detaining any person.

 This Court also discussed the award of

compensation as a remedy for violation of

fundamental   rights   as   a   punitive

measure against State action.

12. People’s Union for Civil 

Liberties vs. Union of India 

& Anr.

(1997) 3 SCC 433

 Two persons alleged to be terrorists were

killed by the police in a false encounter.

 This Court directed the State of Manipur

to   pay   Rs.1   lac   to   the   family   of   the

deceased   and   Rs.10,000   to   PUCL   for

pursuing the case for many years.

13. Municipal   Corporation   of

Delhi,   Delhi  vs.  Uphaar

Tragedy Victims Association

& Ors.

(2011) 14 SCC 481

 A fire in a cinema hall resulted in injury

to   over   100   persons   and   death   of   59

cinemagoers.

 The   fire   was   caused   by   a   transformer

installed by Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB).

 HC had found the Municipal Corporation,

Delhi Police, and the DVB responsible for

the accident.

 This   Court   held   only   DVB  and   theatre

owner liable to pay compensation in the

ratio of 15:85.

 While   doing   so,   this   Court   dealt

extensively   with   the   concept   of

Constitutional Tort.

153.   It will be clear from the decisions listed in the Table above

that   this   Court   and   the   High   Courts   have   been   consistent   in

invoking   Constitutional   tort   whenever   an   act   of   omission   and

commission   on   the   part   of   a   public   functionary,   including   a

Minister, caused harm or loss. But as rightly pointed out by the

learned   Attorney   General   in   his   note,   the   matter   pre­eminently

175

deserves   a   proper   legal   framework   so   that   the   principles   and

procedure are coherently set out without leaving the matter open

ended or vague. In fact, the First Report of the Law Commission

submitted a draft bill way back in 1956. This Court recommended a

legislative   measure   in  Kasturi   Lal  in   1965   and   a   bill   called

Government   (Liability  in   Torts)  Bill  was introduced in 1967. But

nothing happened in the past 55 years. In such circumstances,

courts   cannot   turn   a   blind   eye   but   may   have   to   imaginatively

fashion the remedy to be provided to persons who suffer injury or

loss, without turning them away on the ground that there is no

proper legal frame work.

   

154.  Therefore, our answer to Question No. 5 is as follows:

“A mere statement made by a Minister, inconsistent with the

rights of a citizen under Part­III of the Constitution, may not

constitute a violation of the constitutional rights and become

actionable as Constitutional tort. But if as a consequence of

such a statement, any act of omission or commission is done

176

by the officers  resulting  in harm or loss to a person/citizen,

then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort”.

112  AIR 1954 SC 245