Government (Liability in Torts)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 113 OF 2016
KAUSHAL KISHOR … PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION @ (DIARY) NO. 34629 OF 2017
J U D G M E N T
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
3. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench, by an order dated
24.10.2019, formulated the following five questions to be decided by
this Court:
“…....
3) Whether the State is under a duty to affirmatively
protect the rights of a citizen under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India even against a threat to the
liberty of a citizen by the acts or omissions of another
citizen or private agency?
4) Can a statement made by a Minister, traceable to
any affairs of State or for protecting the Government,
be attributed vicariously to the Government itself,
especially in view of the principle of Collective
Responsibility?
5) Whether a statement by a Minister, inconsistent
with the rights of a citizen under Part Three of the
Constitution, constitutes a violation of such
constitutional rights and is actionable as
‘Constitutional Tort”? …”
.....
141. A tort is a civil wrong, that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act. Halsbury’s Law of England states: “Those civil rights of action which are available for the recovery of unliquidated damages by persons who have sustained injury or loss from acts, statements or omissions of others in breach of duty or contravention of right imposed or conferred by law rather than by agreement are rights of
action in tort.”
142. If Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 changed the course of the law relating to tort in England, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1946 changed in America, the course of law relating to the liability of the State for the tortious acts of its servants. Nevertheless, the claims for damages continued to be resisted for a long time both here and elsewhere on the principle of sovereign immunity. It is interesting to note that on the initiative of the President of India, the Law Ministry took up for consideration the question whether legislation on the lines of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 of the United Kingdom is needed and if so, to what extent. After the constitution of the Law Commission, the Law Ministry referred the matter to the Commission for consideration and report. In its First Report submitted on 11.5.1956 on “Liability of the State in Tort”, the Law Commission took note of (i) the existing law in India; (ii) law in England; (iii) law in America; (iv) law in Australia; (v) law in France; (vi) rule of statutory construction; and (vii) conclusions and proposals.
143. In Chapter VIII containing the conclusions and proposals, the First Report of the Law Commission suggested: (i) that in the context of a welfare State, it is necessary to establish a just relation between the rights of the individual and the responsibilities of the State; (ii) that when the Constitution was framed, the question to what extent, if any, the Union and the States should be made liable for the tortious acts of their servants or agents was left for future legislation; (iii) that the question of demarcating the line up to which the State should be made liable for the tortious acts, involves a nice balancing of considerations, so as not to unduly restrict the sphere of the activities of the State and at the same time to afford sufficient protection to the citizen; (iv) that it is necessary that the law should, as far as possible, be made certain and definite, instead of leaving it to courts to develop the law according to the views of the judges; and (v) that the old distinction between sovereign and the nonsovereign functions or Governmental and the nonGovernmental functions should no longer be invoked to determine the liability of the State.
144. Paragraph 66 of the First Report of the Law Commission contained the principles on which appropriate legislation should proceed. It will be useful to extract paragraph 66 of the First Report of the Law Commission, to understand the sweep of constitutional tort, as it was conceived within a few years of the adoption of the Constitution. In fact, it has laid down the road map very clearly with lot of foresight. Paragraph 66 reads thus: “66. The following shall be the principles on which legislation should proceed:—
I. Under the general law:
Under the general law of torts i.e., the English Common Law as imported into India on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience, with statutory modifications of that law now in force in India (vide the Principles of General Law, Appendix VI)—
(i) The State as employer should be liable for the torts committed by its employees and agents while acting within the scope of their office or, employment.
(ii) The State as employer should be liable in respect of breach of those duties which a person owes to his employees or agents under the general law by reason of being their employer.
(iii) The State should be liable for torts committed by an independent contractor only in cases referred to in Appendix VI.
(iv) The State also should be liable for torts where a corporation owned or controlled by the State would be liable.
(v) The State should be liable in respect of breach of duties attached under the general law to the ownership, occupation, possession or control of immoveable properly from the moment the State occupies or takes possession or assumes control of the property.
(vi) The State should be subject to the general law liability for injury caused by dangerous things (chattels). In respect of (i) to (vi) the State should be entitled to raise the same defences, which a citizen would be entitled to raise under general law.
II. In respect of duties of care imposed by statute:
(i) If a statute authorises the doing of an act which is in itself injurious, the State should not be liable.
(ii) The State should be liable, without proof of negligence, for breach of a statutory duty imposed on it or its employees which causes damage.
(iii) The State should be liable if in the discharge of statutory duties imposed upon it or its employees, the employees act negligently or maliciously, whether or not discretion is involved in the exercise of such duty.
(iv) The State should be liable if in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it or its employees the power is so exercised as to cause nuisance or trespass or the power is exercised negligently or maliciously causing damage.
N.B.—Appendix V shows some of the Acts which contain protection clauses. But under the General Clauses Act a thing is deemed to be done in good faith even if it is done negligently. Therefore, by suitable legislation the protection should be made not to extend to negligent acts however honestly done and for this purpose the relevant clauses in such enactments should be examined.
(v) The State should be subject to the same duties and should have the same rights as a private employer under a statute, whether it is specifically binding on the State or not.
(vi) If an Act negatives or limits the compensation payable to a citizen who suffered damage, coming within the scope of the Act, the liability of the State should be the same as under that Act and the injured person should be entitled only to the remedy, if any, provided under the Act.
III. Miscellaneous:
Patents, Designs and Copyrights: The provisions of Sec. 3 of the Crown Proceedings Act may be
adopted.
IV. General Provisions:
(i) Indemnity and contribution: To enable the State to claim indemnity or contribution, a provision on the lines of Sec. 4 of the Crown Proceedings Act may be adopted.
(ii) Contributory negligence: In England, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act,1945 was enacted amending the law relating to contributory negligence and in view of the provisions of the Crown Proceedings Act the said Act also binds the Crown. In India, the trend of judicial opinion is in favour of holding that the rule in Merryweather v. Nixan [(1799) 8 T.R. 186] does not apply and that there is no legal impediment to one tortfeasor recovering compensation from another. But the law should not be left in an uncertain state and there should be legislation on the lines of the English Act.
(iii) Appropriate provision should be made while revising the Civil Procedure Code to make it obligatory to implead as party to a suit in which a claim for damages against the State is made, the employee, agent or independent contractor for whose act the State is sought to be made liable. Any claim based on indemnity or contribution by the State may also be settled in such proceeding as all the parties will be before the court.
V. Exceptions:
(i)Acts of State: The defence of “Act of State” should be made available to the State for any act, neglect or default of its servants or agents. “Act of State” means an act of the sovereign power directed against another sovereign power or the subjects of another sovereign power not owning temporary allegiance, in pursuance of sovereign rights.
(ii) Judicial acts and execution of judicial process:The State shall not be liable for acts done by judicial officers and persons executing warrants and orders of judicial officers in all cases where protection is given to such officers and persons by Sec. 1 of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850.
(iii) Acts done in the exercise of political functions of the State such as acts relating to:
(a) Foreign Affairs (entry 10, List I, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution);
(b) Diplomatic, Consular and trade representation (entry 11);
(c) United Nations Organisation(entry 12);
(d)Participation in international conferences, associations and other bodies and implementing of decisions made
thereat (entry 13);
(e) entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries (entry14);
(f) war and peace (entry 15);
(g) foreign jurisdiction (entry 16);
(h) anything done by the President, Governor or Rajpramukh in the exercise of the following functions: Power of summoning, proroguing and dissolving the Legislature, vetoing of laws and anything done by the President in the exercise of the powers to issue Proclamations under the Constitution;
(i) Acts done under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 1947;
(j) Acts done or omitted to be done under a Proclamation of Emergency when the security of the State is threatened.
(iv) Acts done in relation to the Defence Forces: (a) Combatant activities of the Armed Forces during the time of war; (b) Acts done in the exercise of the powers vested in the Union for the purpose of training or maintaining the efficiency of the Defence Forces;
The statutes relating to these already provide for payment of compensation and the machinery for determining the compensation: See Manoeuvres, Field Firing and Artillery Practice Act, 1948; Seaward Artillery Practice Act, 1949;
(c) The liability of the State for personal injury or death caused by a member of the Armed Forces to another member while on duty shall be restricted in the same manner as in England (Sec. 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act)
(v) Miscellaneous:
(a) any claim arising out of defamation, malicious prosecution and malicious arrest,
(b) any claim arising out of the operation of quarantine law,
(c) existing immunity under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and Indian Post Offices Act, 1898,
(d) foreign torts. (The English provision may be adopted.)”
145. It appears that based on the First Report of the Law Commission, a Bill known as the Government (Liability in Torts) Bill was introduced in 1967, but the same did not become the law. As a consequence, a huge burden was cast on the Courts to develop the law through judicial precedents, some of which we shall see now.
146. The judicial journey actually started off on a right note with the decision in The State of Bihar vs. Abdul Majid112, where a Government servant who was dismissed but later reinstated, filed a suit for recovery of arrears of salary. Though the State raised a defence on the basis of the doctrine of pleasure, this Court rejected the same on the ground that said doctrine based on the Latin
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phrase “durante bene placito” (during pleasure) has no application
in India. This decision was followed in State of Rajasthan vs. Mst.
Vidhyawati113
, which involved a claim for compensation by the
widow of a person who was fatally knocked down by a jeep owned
and maintained by the State. When sovereign immunity was
pleaded, this Court observed in Vidhyawati (supra): “when the
rule of immunity in favour of the Crown, based on common
law in the United Kingdom has disappeared from the land of
its birth, there is no legal warrant for holding that it has any
validity in this country, particularly after the Constitution.”
147. On the question of the liability of the State, for the tortious
acts of its servants, this Court opined in Vidhyawati, as follows:
“(10) This case also meets the second branch of the
argument that the State cannot be liable for the
tortious acts of its servants, when such servants are
engaged on an activity connected with the affairs of the
State. In this connection it has to be remembered that
under the Constitution we have established a welfare
state, whose functions are not confined only to
maintaining law and order, but extend to engaging in
all activities including industry, public transport, state
trading, to name only a few of them. …”
113 AIR 1962 SC 933
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148. But despite the decisions in Abdul Majid (supra) and
Vidhyawati, this Court fell into a slippery slope in Kasturi Lal. It
was a case where the partner of a firm dealing in bullion and other
goods was arrested and detained in police custody and the gold and
silver that he was carrying was seized by the police. When he was
released later, the silver was returned but the Head Constable who
effected the arrest misappropriated the gold and fled away to
Pakistan in October, 1947. The suit filed by Kasturi Lal for
recovery of the value of the gold, was resisted on the ground that
this was not a case of negligence of the servants of the State and
that even if negligence was held proved against the police officers
the State could not be held liable. While upholding the contention of
the State, this Court said “if a tortious act is committed by a public
servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask
is: was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge
of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based
on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public
servant? If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages
for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie. On the other hand, if
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the tortious act has been committed by a public servant in discharge
of duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any
sovereign power, an action for damages would lie. The act of the
public servant committed by him during the course of his employment
is in this category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been
employed by a private individual for the same purpose.”
149. In fact, it was suggested by this Court in Kasturi Lal that
the Legislatures in India should seriously consider making
legislative enactments to regulate and control their claim for
immunity. Before proceeding further with the journey in the
chronological sequence, it must be mentioned that the decision in
Kasturi Lal was diluted to some extent after nearly 30 years which
we shall take note of at the appropriate stage.
150. In Khatri (II) vs. State of Bihar.114, which came to be
popularly known as Bhagalpur blinding case, this Court was dealing
with a brutal incident of Police atrocity which resulted in twentyfour prisoners being blinded. Though an opportunity was provided
114 (1981) 1 SCC 627
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to this Court to signal the arrival of Constitutional tort in the said
case and though the petitioners sought compensation for the
violation of their Article 21 right, this Court simply postponed the
decision to a future date by holding that they are issues of the
gravest Constitutional importance, involving the exploration of new
dimension of the right to life and personal liberty.
151. But within a couple of years, another opportunity arose in
Rudul Sah (supra), which related to the unlawful detention of a
prisoner for fourteen years even after his acquittal. This shook the
conscience of this Court. Therefore, this Court awarded
compensation in an arbitrary sum of money, even while reserving
the right of the petitioner to bring a suit for recovery of appropriate
damages. This Court said that the order of compensation passed by
this Court was in the nature of palliative. When it is suggested by
the State that the appropriate remedy would be only to file a suit for
damages, this Court said that by refusing to order anything
(towards compensation), this Court would be doing mere lipservice
to the fundamental right to liberty and that one of the telling ways
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in which the violation of the right by the State can be reasonably
prevented, is to mulct its violators with monetary compensation.
152. After Rudul Sah, there was no looking back. Instead of
providing elaborate details, we think it is sufficient to provide in a
tabular form, details of the cases where this Court awarded
compensation in public law, invoking the principle of constitutional
tort, either expressly or impliedly.
Sr.
No.
Case Laws Decision
1. Sebastian M.Hongray vs.
Union of India
(1984) 3 SCC 82
Two men who were taken for questioning
by 21st Sikh Regiment never returned
home.
When a writ of habeas corpus was filed
by a JNU student, this Court directed
that the missing men be produced before
the Court. This order could not be
complied with.
Court awarded compensation of Rs.1lac
to the wives of the missing men on
account of mental agony suffered by
them.
2. Bhim Singh, MLA vs. State
of J&K.
(1985) 4 SCC 677
An MLA was illegally arrested and
detained to prevent him from attending a
session of the Jammu & Kashmir State
Legislative Assembly.
FIR was registered u/s 153A, IPC and
order of remand was obtained from the
Magistrate without producing the MLA
before Court.
In a writ for habeas corpus filed by his
wife, this Court observed that there had
been a violation of his fundamental rights
under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the
Constitution and accordingly directed the
State of Jammu and Kashmir to pay
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Bhim Singh a sum of Rs.50,000/ as
compensation.
3. Peoples’ Union for
Democratic Rights vs. State
of Bihar &Ors.
(1987) 1 SCC 265
A public interest litigation was filed
against the illegal shooting by police
officers against members of a peaceful
assembly.
Several were injured and 21 died
(including children) due to this incident.
While the State had paid a compensation
of Rs.10,000 each to heirs of the
deceased, this Court found it insufficient
and directed payment of Rs.20,000 to
dependants of each deceased and
Rs.5,000 to each injured person.
4. Saheli, a Women’s Resources
Centre through Ms. Nalini
Bhanot & Ors. vs.
Commissioner of Police,
Delhi Police Headquarters &
Ors.
(1990) 1 SCC 422
Two women were forcefully evicted from
their homes. The landlord was aided by
the SHO and SI in the assault that led to
demise of the nineyearold son of one of
the women.
This Court awarded compensation of
Rs.75,000 to the mother of the deceased
child.
5. Supreme Court Legal Aid
Committee through its
Hony. Secretary vs. State of
Bihar & Ors.
(1991) 3 SCC 482
A person injured in a train robbery, was
taken to the nearest hospital by the
Police by tying him to the footboard of a
vehicle. This led to his death.
This Court observed that had timely care
been given to the victim he might have
been saved.
The State of Bihar was directed to pay
Rs.20,000 to the legal heirs of the
deceased.
6. Nilabati Behera (Smt.) alias
Lalita Behera (Through the
Supreme Court Legal Aid
Committee) vs. State of
Orissa & Ors.
(1993) 2 SCC 746
Petitioner was a mother whose son had
died in police custody.
This Court directed the State to pay
compensation of Rs.1.5 lacs.
7. Arvinder Singh Bagga vs.
State of U.P. & Ors.
(1994) 6 SCC 565
A married woman was detained and
physically assaulted in a police station
with a view to coerce her to implicate her
husband and his family in a case of
abduction and forcible marriage.
After taking her statement, her husband
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and his family were also harassed by the
police.
This Court observed that the police had
exhibited highhandedness and
uncivilized behaviour and awarded the
woman a compensation of Rs.10,000 and
members of her family Rs.5,000 each.
8. N. Nagendra Rao & Co. vs.
State of A.P.
(1994) 6 SCC 205
Appellant was in the business of food
grains and fertiliser. On an inspection by
the concerned authorities, his stocks
were seized.
As was the practice, the food grains in
custody were sold and the proceeds
deposited in the Treasury, but the
fertilisers were not dealt with in the same
manner causing great loss to the
Petitioner.
In a suit for negligence and misfeasance
of public authorities, this Court further
developed the concept of Constitutional
Tort and limited the scope of sovereign
immunity laid down in Kasturilal. The
State was held vicariously liable for the
actions of the authorities.
9. Inder Singh vs. State of
Punjab & Ors.
(1995) 3 SCC 702
A Deputy Superintendent of Police along
with his subordinates abducted and
killed seven persons due to personal
vengeance.
This Court ordered an inquiry by the
CBI.After CBI filed a report, this court
directed the State to pay Rs.1.5 lacs to
the legal heirs (to be recovered from guilty
policemen later) and State to pay costs
quantified at Rs.25,000.
10. Paschim Banga Khet
Mazdoor Samity & Ors. vs.
State of W.B. & Anr.
(1996) 4 SCC 37
The callous attitude on the part of the
medical authorities at various
Governmentrun hospitals in Calcutta in
providing treatment to a train accident
victim was highlighted in this case.
This Court directed the State to pay
Rs.25,000 for the denial of its
constitutional obligations of care.
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11. D.K. Basu vs. State of W.B.
(1997) 1 SCC 416
In a public interest litigation involving
incidents of custodial violence in West
Bengal, this Court issued guidelines for
law enforcement agencies to follow when
arresting and detaining any person.
This Court also discussed the award of
compensation as a remedy for violation of
fundamental rights as a punitive
measure against State action.
12. People’s Union for Civil
Liberties vs. Union of India
& Anr.
(1997) 3 SCC 433
Two persons alleged to be terrorists were
killed by the police in a false encounter.
This Court directed the State of Manipur
to pay Rs.1 lac to the family of the
deceased and Rs.10,000 to PUCL for
pursuing the case for many years.
13. Municipal Corporation of
Delhi, Delhi vs. Uphaar
Tragedy Victims Association
& Ors.
(2011) 14 SCC 481
A fire in a cinema hall resulted in injury
to over 100 persons and death of 59
cinemagoers.
The fire was caused by a transformer
installed by Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB).
HC had found the Municipal Corporation,
Delhi Police, and the DVB responsible for
the accident.
This Court held only DVB and theatre
owner liable to pay compensation in the
ratio of 15:85.
While doing so, this Court dealt
extensively with the concept of
Constitutional Tort.
153. It will be clear from the decisions listed in the Table above
that this Court and the High Courts have been consistent in
invoking Constitutional tort whenever an act of omission and
commission on the part of a public functionary, including a
Minister, caused harm or loss. But as rightly pointed out by the
learned Attorney General in his note, the matter preeminently
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deserves a proper legal framework so that the principles and
procedure are coherently set out without leaving the matter open
ended or vague. In fact, the First Report of the Law Commission
submitted a draft bill way back in 1956. This Court recommended a
legislative measure in Kasturi Lal in 1965 and a bill called
Government (Liability in Torts) Bill was introduced in 1967. But
nothing happened in the past 55 years. In such circumstances,
courts cannot turn a blind eye but may have to imaginatively
fashion the remedy to be provided to persons who suffer injury or
loss, without turning them away on the ground that there is no
proper legal frame work.
154. Therefore, our answer to Question No. 5 is as follows:
“A mere statement made by a Minister, inconsistent with the
rights of a citizen under PartIII of the Constitution, may not
constitute a violation of the constitutional rights and become
actionable as Constitutional tort. But if as a consequence of
such a statement, any act of omission or commission is done
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by the officers resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen,
then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort”.
112 AIR 1954 SC 245