genuine public interest

(viii)  In Asha Ranjan  (supra), the right to free trial, of an accused vis­à­vis  the   victim,   came   up   for   consideration.   The   Court propounded in paragraph 61: “61. Be it stated, circumstances may emerge that may necessitate for balancing between intra­fundamental rights. It has been distinctly understood that the test that   has   to   be   applied   while   balancing   the   two fundamental rights or inter fundamental rights, the principles applied may be different than the principle to   be   applied   in   intra­conflict   between   the   same fundamental right. To elaborate, as in this case, the accused has a fundamental right to have a fair trial under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution.   Similarly,   the 66 victims who are directly affected and also form a part of the constituent of the collective, have a fundamental right for a fair trial. Thus, there can be two individuals both having legitimacy to claim or assert the right. The factum of legitimacy is a primary consideration. It has to   be   remembered   that   no   fundamental   right   is absolute   and   it   can   have   limitations   in   certain circumstances.   Thus,   permissible   limitations   are imposed by the State. The said limitations are to be within   the   bounds   of   law.   However,   when   there   is intra­conflict of the right conferred under the same article,   like   fair   trial   in   this   case,   the   test   that   is required to be applied, we are disposed to think, it would   be   “paramount   collective   interest”   or “sustenance   of   public   confidence   in   the   justice dispensation   system”.   An   example   can   be   cited.   A group of persons in the name of “class honour”, as has been stated in Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P., (2016) 9 SCC 541: (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 621], cannot curtail or throttle the choice of a woman. It is because choice of woman in choosing her partner in life is a legitimate constitutional right. It is founded on individual choice that is recognised in the Constitution under Article 19, and such a right is not expected to succumb to the concept of “class honour” or “group thinking”. It is because the sense of class honour has no legitimacy even if it is practised by the collective under some kind of a notion. Therefore, if the collective interest or the public   interest   that   serves   the   public   cause   and further   has   the   legitimacy   to   claim   or   assert   a fundamental right, then only it can put forth that their right should be protected. There can be no denial of the fact that the rights of the victims for a fair trial is an inseparable aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution and when they assert that right by themselves as well as the part of the collective, the conception of public interest   gets   galvanised.   The   accentuated   public interest   in   such   circumstances   has   to   be   given primacy, for it furthers and promotes “Rule of Law”. …”