Knowledge or intention to cause death

Supreme Court of India
Sushil Ansal vs State Thr.Cbi on 5 March, 2014
Author: .....J.
Bench: T.S. Thakur, Gyan Sudha Misra
 REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.597 OF 2010
Sushil Ansal Appellant
 Versus
State Through CBI Respondent
(With Crl. Appeals No.598/2010, 599/2010, 600-602/2010, 604/2010, 605-
616/2010 and 617-627/2010)
181. The charge framed against N.S. Chopra (A-6) and other Managers of Uphaar Cinema was one
for commission of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 36 of the IPC.
The allegation made against the Managers was that even when they were present on the premises at
the time of the incident, they had failed to either warn the patrons or facilitate their escape. They
instead fled the scene despite the knowledge that death was likely to be caused by their acts of
omission and commission. The Trial Court had found the charge proved and convicted and
sentenced N.S. Chopra to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven years besides a fine of
Rs.5,000/- and imprisonment for six months in default of payment. The High Court reversed that
view qua N.S. Chopra and also R.K. Sharma (A-5) (since deceased). The High Court acquitted them
of the charges for reasons which it summed up in the following words:
10.11 Section 304, first part requires proof of intention to cause death or such bodily
harm as would cause death; the second part requires proof that knowledge existed
that such injury would result in death, or grievous injury likely to result in death. The
crucial aspect in both cases, is the state of mind, i.e intention or knowledge of the
consequence. Proof of such intention or knowledge has to be necessarily, of a high
order; all other hypotheses of innocence of the accused, have to be ruled out. The
prosecution here, glaringly has not proved when these two accused fled the cinema
hall; there is no eyewitness testifying to their having been in the balcony when the
smoke entered the hall, and having left it, which could have proved knowledge of the
likely deaths and grievous bodily injuries. Thus, this court is of the opinion that proof
of these appellants, i.e N.S. Chopra and R.K. Sharma, having committed the offence
under Section 304, is not forthcoming. Their conviction under that provision cannot,
therefore, be sustained. (emphasis supplied)
182. The High Court also examined whether N.S. Chopra and R.K. Sharma could be convicted under
Section 304A IPC, and answered that question in the negative. The High Court was of the view that
the prosecution had failed to establish that N.S. Chopra was present on the scene and also that the
documentary evidence adduced at the trial proved that he had not reported for duty on the fateful
day. The High Court observed:
10.13 As far as R. K. Sharma is concerned, the evidence establishes that he had
reported for duty N.S. Chopra, on the other hand, according to the documentary
evidence (Ex. PW-108/DB- 1, found in Ex.PW97/C) had not reported for duty. In his
statement under Section 313, he mentioned having reached the cinema hall at 5-30
PM, and not being allowed inside, since the fire was raging in the building.
xx xx xx 10.17 The totality of the above circumstances no doubt points to complete
managerial and supervisory failure in the cinema. Such inaction is certainly culpable,
and points to grave lapses. This undoubtedly was an important and significant part of
the causation chain. Yet, to convict the accused R.K. Sharma and N.C. Chopra, there
should be more convincing proof of involvement. At best, there is evidence of
suspicion of their involvement. Yet, no attempt to prove that they were present, and
did not take any effective measures to evacuate the patrons, which they were bound
Sushil Ansal vs State Thr.Cbi on 5 March, 2014
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/9513811/ 76
to do, in the normal course of their duty, has been made. Mere proof that these
accused were Assistant Manager, and Manager, as on the date of the accident, and
that one of them had reported earlier, during the day, is not adequate to prove that
they caused death by criminally negligent, or rash act. There was failure on the part
of the trial court to notice that the two vital aspects, i.e duty and breach of that duty
of such scale, as to amount to an offence. Their appeals are entitled to succeed. These
appellants have to, therefore, be acquitted of the charges. Their conviction is
consequently set aside. (emphasis supplied)
183. In fairness to Mr. Salve and Mr. Tulsi, we must say that no serious attempt was made by them
to demolish the reasoning adopted by the High Court in coming to its conclusion. That apart, the
view taken by the High Court on a fair appreciation of the evidence, both oral and documentary,
does not even otherwise call for any interference by us as the same is a reasonably possible view.