Process : When information is given at the police station Till Trial

Supreme Court of India
Dilawar Singh vs State Of Delhi on 5 September, 2007
Author: . A Pasayat
Bench: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, D.K. Jain
 CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 491 of 2002
J U D G M E N T CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.491 OF 2002 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J10. When information is given at the police station, normally two courses are open. A station diary
entry can be made or the FIR registered. In case there is any deviation, recourse to Section 154(3)
has to be made. If that does not yield any result a complaint can be filed.
11. Section 156 reads as follows:
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156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable cases. - (1) Any officer in charge of a police
station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having
jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or
try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the
ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to
investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above
mentioned.
12. Section 156 falling within Chapter XII, deals with powers of police officers to investigate
cognizable offences. Investigation envisaged in Section 202 contained in Chapter XV is different
from the investigation contemplated under Section 156 of the Cr.P.C..
13. Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. contains provisions relating to information to the police and their
powers to investigate, whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions
relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any
offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets
altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Section 156,
falling within Chapter XII deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences.
True, Section 202, which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to direct
an investigation by a police officer. But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from
the investigation contemplated in Section 156 of the Cr.P.C..
14. The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. have been
elaborated in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C.. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a
book to be kept by the officer in charge of a police station, of the substance of the information
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up
only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. The investigation
contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a
Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section
156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with
the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. But the significant point to be noticed is, when
a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the
offence.
15. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the
offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter
XV of the Cr.P.C. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Cr.P.C. makes the position clear that the
investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an
investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only
for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed
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further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1) i.e. or direct an
investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose
of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
16. This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and
the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him.
17. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the
offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. If he does so, he is not to examine
the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the
purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to
register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all, registration of an FIR involves only the
process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable
offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of
Cr.P.C. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under
Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of
the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint
because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. only
thereafter.
18. The above position was highlighted in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. and Another [2001(2)
SCC 628].
19. In Gopal Das Sindhi and Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr. (AIR 1961 SC 986) it was observed as
follows:
When the complaint was received by Mr. Thomas on August 3, 1957, his order, which we have
already quoted, clearly indicates that he did not take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the
complaint but had sent the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to the Officer Incharge of
Police Station Gauhati for investigation. Section 156(3) states Any Magistrate empowered under
section 190 may order such investigation as above-mentioned. Mr. Thomas was certainly a
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance under Section 190 and he was empowered to take
cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint. He, however, decided not to take cognizance
but to send the complaint to the police for investigation as Sections 147, 342 and 448 were
cognizable offences. It was, however, urged that once a complaint was filed the Magistrate was
bound to take cognizance and proceed under Chapter XVI of the Cr.P.C. It is clear, however, that
Chapter XVI would come into play only if the Magistrate had taken cognizance of an offence on the
complaint filed before him, because Section 200 states that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an
offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon
oath and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the
complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate. If the Magistrate had not taken
cognizance of the offence on the complaint filed before him, he was not obliged to examine the
complainant on oath and the witnesses present at the time of the filing of the complaint. We cannot
read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to
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take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are
unable to construe the word 'may' in Section 190 to mean 'must'. The reason is obvious. A complaint
disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section
156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be
wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the
police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion
and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so then he would have to proceed in the
manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Cr.P.C. Numerous cases were cited before us in support of
the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. Certain submissions were also made as to what is
meant by taking cognizance. It is unnecessary to refer to the cases cited. The following
observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal 437 What is taking cognizance has not
been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to
me clear however that before it can be said that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence
under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the
contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way
as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter- proceeding under Section 200 and
thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his
mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking
action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search
warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the
offence.
were approved by this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1951 SCR 312). It would be clear
from the observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta that when a Magistrate applies his mind not for the
purpose of proceeding under the various sections of Chapter XVI but for taking action of some other
kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of
investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. The observations of Mr.
Justice Das Gupta above referred to were also approved by this Court in the case of Narayandas
Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1959 SC 1118). It will be clear, therefore, that
in the present case neither the Additional District Magistrate nor Mr. Thomas applied his mind to
the complaint filed on August 3, 1957, with a view to taking cognizance of an offence. The Additional
District Magistrate passed on the complaint to Mr. Thomas to deal with it. Mr. Thomas seeing that
cognizable offences were mentioned in the complaint did not apply his mind to it with a view to
taking cognizance of any offence; on the contrary in his opinion it was a matter to be investigated by
the police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.. The action of Mr. Thomas comes within the
observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta. In these circumstances, we do not think that the first
contention on behalf of the appellants has any substance.
20. In Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. The State of West Bengal (AIR 1959 SC 1118) it was
observed as under: On 19.9.1952, the appellant appeared before the Additional District Magistrate
who recorded the following order:-
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He is to give bail of Rs.50,000 with ten sureties of Rs. 5,000 each. Seen Police report. Time allowed
till 19th November, 1952, for completing investigation. On 19.11.952, on perusal of the police report
the Magistrate allowed further time for investigation until January 2, 1953, and on that date time
was further extended to February 2, 1953. In the meantime, on January 27, 1953, Inspector Mitra
had been authorized under s.23(3)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to file a complaint.
Accordingly, a complaint was filed on February 2, 1953. The Additional District Magistrate thereon
recorded the following order: Seen the complaint filed to day against the accused Narayandas
Bhagwandas Madhavdas under section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act read with
section 23B thereof read with Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act and Notification No. F.E.R.A.
105/51 dated the 27th February, 1951, as amended, issued by the Reserve Bank of India under
Section 8(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Seen the letter of authority. To Sri M. H.
Sinha, S. D.M. (Sadar), Magistrate 1st class (spl.
empowered) for favour of disposal according to law. Accused to appear before him.
Accordingly, on the same date Mr. Sinha then recorded the following order:-
Accused present. Petition filed for reduction of bail. Considering all facts, bail granted for
Rs.25,000 with 5 sureties.
To 26.3.1952 and 27.3.1952 for evidence.
It is clear from these orders that on 19.91952, the Additional District Magistrate had not taken
cognizance of the offence because he had allowed the police time till November 19, 1952, for
completing the investigation. By his subsequent orders time for investigation was further extended
until February 2, 1953. On what date the complaint was filed and the order of the Additional District
Magistrate clearly indicated that he took cognizance of the offence and sent the case for trial to Mr.
Sinha. It would also appear from the order of Mr. Sinha that if the Additional District Magistrate did
not take cognizance, he certainly did because he considered whether the bail should be reduced and
fixed the 26th and 27th of March, for evidence. It was, however, argued that when Mitra applied for
a search warrant on September, 16, 1952, the Additional District Magistrate had recorded an order
thereon, Permitted. Issue search warrant. It was on this date that the Additional District
Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. We cannot agree with this submission because the
petition of Inspector Mitra clearly states that As this is non-cognizable offence, I pray that you will
kindly permit me to investigate the case under section 155 Cr.P.C. That is to say, that the Additional
District Magistrate was not being asked to take cognizance of the offence. He was merely requested
to grant permission to the police officer to investigate a non- cognizable offence. The petition
requesting the Additional District Magistrate to issue a warrant of arrest and his order directing the
issue of such a warrant cannot also be regarded as orders which indicate that the Additional District
Magistrate thereby took cognizance of the offence. It was clearly stated in the petition that for the
purposes of investigation his presence was necessary. The step taken by Inspector Mitra was merely
a step in the investigation of the case. He had not himself the power to make an arrest having regard
to the provisions of s. 155(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In order to facilitate his
investigation it was necessary for him to arrest the appellant and that he could not do without a
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warrant of arrest from the Additional District Magistrate. As already stated, the order of the
Additional District Magistrate of September 19, 1952, makes it quite clear that he was still regarding
the matter as one under investigation. It could not be said with any good reason that the Additional
District Magistrate had either on September 16, or at any subsequent date upto February 2, 1953,
applied his mind to the case with a view to issuing a process against the appellant. The appellant had
appeared before the Magistrate on February 2, 1953, and the question of issuing summons to him
did not arise. The Additional District Magistrate, however, must be regarded as having taken
cognizance on this date because he sent the case to Mr. Sinha for trial. There was no legal bar to the
Additional District Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence on February 2, 1953, as on that date
Inspector Mitra's complaint was one which he was authorized to make by the Reserve Bank under s.
23(3)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. It is thus clear to us that on a proper reading of
the various orders made by the Additional District Magistrate no cognizance of the offence was
taken until February 2, 1953. The argument that he took cognizance of the offence on September 16,
1952, is without foundation. The orders passed by the Additional District Magistrate on September
16, 1952, September 19, 1952, November 19, 1952, and January 2, 1953, were orders passed while
the investigation by the police into a non- cognizable offence was in progress. If at the end of the
investigation no complaint had been filed against the appellant the police could have under the
provisions of s. 169 of the Cr.P.C. released him on his executing a bond with or without sureties to
appear if and when so required before the Additional District Magistrate empowered to take
cognizance of the offence on a police report and to try the accused or commit him for trial. The
Magistrate would not be required to pass any further orders in the matter. If, on the other hand,
after completing the investigation a complaint was filed, as in this case, it would be the duty of the
Additional District Magistrate then to enquire whether the complaint had been filed with the
requisite authority of the Reserve Bank as required by s. 23(3)(b) of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act. It is only at this stage that the Additional District Magistrate would be called upon to
make up his mind whether he would take cognizance of the offence. If the complaint was filed with
the authority of the Reserve Bank, as aforesaid, there would be no legal bar to the Magistrate taking
cognizance. On the other hand, if there was no proper authorization to file the complaint as required
by s. 23 the Magistrate concerned would be prohibited from taking cognizance. In the present case,
as the requisite authority had been granted by the Reserve Bank on January 27, 1953, to file a
complaint, the complaint filed on February 2, was one which complied with the provisions of s. 23 of
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Additional District Magistrate could take cognizance
of the offence which, indeed, he did on that date. The following observation by Das Gupta, J., in the
case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerji
[A.I.R. (1950) Cal. 437] was approved by this Court in the case of R. R. Chari v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh [[1951] S.C.R. 312]:-
What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. and I have no
desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any
magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under section 190(1)(a) Criminal Procedure Code, he
must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the
purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter -
proceeding under section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under section 202.
When the magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent
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sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under
section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to
have taken cognizance of the offence.
It is, however, argued that in Chari's case this Court was dealing with a matter which came under the
Prevention of Corruption Act. It seems to us, however, that that makes no difference. It is the
principle which was enunciated by Das Gupta, J., which was approved. As to when cognizance is
taken of an offence will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to
attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuing of a search warrant for the purpose of
an investigation or of a warrant of arrest for that purpose cannot by themselves be regarded as acts
by which cognizance was taken of an offence. Obviously, it is only when a Magistrate applies his
mind for the purpose of proceeding under s. 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVI of the
Code of Criminal Procedure or under s. 204 of Chapter XVII of the Code that it can be positively
stated that he had applied his mind and therefore had taken cognizance.
21. These aspects were highlighted in Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan (Smt.) and Anr. (2006 (1) SCC
627)