WILLFUL&DELIBERATE DISOBEDIENCE of Law laid down by courts by public servants attracts Contempt of court

The Bombay High Court, in

 Legrand (India) Private Ltd. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 21 June, 2007

Has held as below

…..

5. The legal position regarding the binding nature of judgments delivered by High Court was clearly explained as far back as 1962 by the Supreme Court. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta , Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Mudholkar, J. has explained, though A.K. Sarkar, J. (the Third Member of the Bench) did not fully agree with this aspect of the legal position, the law laid down (para 29 of thereof) reads as under:

This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest Court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared under Article 215, every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Article 226, it has plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority including inappropriate cases any Govt, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 227 it has jurisdiction over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all the subordinate Courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate Courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working; otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer. We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest Court in the State is binding on authorities, or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings, contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction.

(Emphasis supplied by us)

6. The above legal position was reiterated in Makhan Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir . It was in the context of the law declared by the Supreme Court that the decision laid down to that effect so far as Art. 141 of the Constitution was concerned, but what has been observed in para 5 at p. 2209 by Grover, J. speaking for the Supreme Court has equal application so far as pronouncements by the High Courts are concerned. Grover, J. observed (at page 2209) The judgment which was delivered did not merely declare the promotions granted to the respondents in the writ petition filed at the previous stage as unconstitutional but also laid down in clear and unequivocal terms that the distribution of appointments, posts or promotions made in the implementation of the communal policy was contrary to the constitutional guarantee of Article 16. The law so declared by this Court was binding on the respondent-State and its officers and they were bound to follow it whether a majority of the present respondents were parties or not in the previous petition.

(Emphasis supplied) It cannot therefore be contended by anyone that since Acharya, the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2215 of 1979, was not a party to Special Civil Application No. 806 of 1975, that the law laid down by D.A. Desai, J. in his judgment in that case on Aug, 7, 1975 was not applicable to the case of Acharya. Whether the law is declared by the Supreme Court or whether the law is declared by the High Court, the legal position as regards authorities and tribunals subordinate to the Supreme Court and High Courts respectively is the same as pointed out by Subba Rao, J. in East India Commercial Co's case AIR 1962 SC 1803 (supra).

7. In Baradakanta Mishra v. Bhimsen Dixit the legal position regarding binding nature of the High Court's decision was once again reiterated by the Supreme Court and after quoting the above passage which we have extracted from the judgment of Subba Rao, J. in East India Commercial Co's case (supra) in paras 15 and 16 of the judgment. Dwivedi, J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed at page 2469 (of AIR) : (at pp. 22, 23 of Cr.L.J.) The conduct of the appellant in not following the previous decision of the High Court is calculated to create confusion in the administration of law. It will undermine respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is therefore, comprehended by the principles underlying the law of contempt. The analogy of the inferior Court's disobedience to the specific order of a superior Court also suggests that his conduct falls within the purview of the law of contempt. Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the Court in a particular case, similarly any deliberate and malafide conduct of not following the law laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court. Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an individual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court generally, but it is also likely to subvert the Rule of Law and engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law.

8. In Hasmukhlal C. Shah v. State of Gujarat (1978) 19 Guj LR 378, a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court consisting of J. B. Mehta and P.D. Desai, JJ. after examining several decisions on the point, observed:

In a Government which is ruled by laws, there must be complete awareness to carry out faithfully and honestly lawful orders passed by a Court of law after impartial adjudication. Then only will private individuals, organisations and institutions learn to respect the decisions of Court. In absence of such attitude on the part of all concerned, chaotic conditions might arise and the function assigned to the Courts of law under the Constitution might be rendered a futile exercise.

9. From the above four decisions, the following propositions emerge:

(a) It is immaterial that in a previous litigation the particular petitioner before the Court was or was not a party, but if a law on a particular point has been laid down by the High Court, it must be followed by all authorities and tribunals in the State ;

(b) The law laid down by the High Court must be followed by all authorities and subordinate tribunals when it has been declared by the highest Court in the State and they cannot ignore it either in initiating proceedings or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding;

(c) If in spite of the earlier exposition of law by the High Court having been pointed out and attention being pointedly drawn to that legal position, in utter disregard of that position, proceedings are initiated, it must be held to be a wilful disregard of the law laid down by the High Court and would amount to civil contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.