a claim for the violation of a fundamental right would lie. Where the author of an identical interference is a non-state actor

s Court in Puttaswamy. The relevant excerpts from the said decision have been reproduced hereinunder: “253. Once we have arrived at this understanding of the nature of fundamental rights, we can dismantle a core assumption of the Union's argument: that a right must either be a common law right or a fundamental right. The only material distinctions between the two classes of right - of which the nature and content may be the same - lie in the incidence of the duty to respect the right and in the forum in which a failure to do so can be redressed. Common law rights are horizontal in their operation when they are violated by one's fellow man, he can be named and proceeded against in an ordinary court of law. Constitutional and fundamental rights, on the other hand, provide remedy against the violation of a valued interest by the 'state', as an abstract entity, whether through legislation or otherwise, as well as by identifiable public officials, being individuals clothed with the powers of the state. It is perfectly possible for an interest to simultaneously be recognized as a common law right and a fundamental right. Where the interference with a recognized interest is by the state or any other like entity recognized by Article 87 12, a claim for the violation of a fundamental right would lie. Where the author of an identical interference is a non-state actor, an action at common law would lie in an ordinary court. 254. Privacy has the nature of being both a common law right as well as a fundamental right. Its content, in both forms, is identical. All that differs is the incidence of burden and the forum for enforcement for each form.” [Emphasis by me