whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2)

4. The second part of Question No.1 is as to whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) by invoking other fundamental rights. 35. This part of Question No.1 already stands partly answered while dealing with the first part of Question No.1.  The decisions of this   Court   in  Express   Newspapers   (Private)   Ltd.  (supra),   the Cricket   Association   of   Bengal  (supra) and  Ramlila   Maidan 53 Incident, in re. (supra), provide a complete answer to the question whether additional restrictions on the right to free speech can be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2). 36. The  question   whether  additional   restrictions   can  peep  into Article 19(2), by invoking other fundamental rights, also stands answered by this Court in  Sakal  Papers.  In  Sakal  Papers,  the Central Government issued an order called Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order, 1960 in exercise of the power conferred under the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, fixing the maximum number of pages that might be published by a newspaper according to the price charged. Therefore, the publisher of a Marathi Newspaper challenged the constitutionality of both the Act and the Order.  One of the arguments raised on behalf of the State in the said case was that there are two aspects of the activities of newspapers namely, (i)  the dissemination of news and views; and  (ii)  the commercial aspect.  While the former would fall under Article 19(1)(a), the latter would fall under Article 19(1)(g).   37. Since   these   two   rights   are   independent   and   since   the restrictions on the right under Article 19(1)(g) can be placed in the 54 interest of the general public under Article 19(6), it was contended by the State in Sakal Papers that the Act and the Order are saved by clause (6) of Article 19. But the said argument of the State was rejected   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in  Sakal   Papers,  in   the following words: “It may well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public, restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not open to the State to achieve this object by directly and immediately   curtailing   any   other   freedom   of   that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not susceptible of abridgement on the same grounds as are set out in cl. (6) of Art. 19.  Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken away with the object of placing restrictions on the business activities of a citizen. Freedom of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality   or   in   relation   to   contempt   of   court, defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be curtailed in the interest   of   the   general   public.  If   a   law   directly affecting it is challenged it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under cls. (3)   to   (6).   For,   the   scheme   of   Art.   19   is   to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may   be   subjected   and   the   objects   for   securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and cl. (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That   is   the   plain   meaning   of   this   clause.   It follows   from   this   that   the   State   cannot  make  a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore, for holding that 55 the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing   an   otherwise   permissible   restriction   on another freedom.” 38. We are conscious of the fact that  Sakal  Papers was a case where the petitioner before the Court had two different fundamental rights and the law made by the State fell within the permitted restrictions   upon   the   exercise  of   one   of  those  two  fundamental rights.  However, the restriction traceable to clause (6) of Article 19 was   not   available   in   clause   (2)   of   Article   19.   It   is   in   such circumstances   that   this   Court   held   that   the   restriction   validly imposed   upon   the   exercise   of   one   fundamental   right   cannot automatically become valid while dealing with another fundamental right   of   the   same   person,   the   restriction   of   which   stands Constitutionally on different parameters. 39. In  Sakal   Papers  the   conflict   was   neither   between   one individual’s   fundamental   right  qua  another   individual’s fundamental   right   nor   one   fundamental   right  qua  another fundamental right of the same individual. It was a case where a restriction validly made upon a fundamental right was held invalid qua another fundamental right of the same individual.  In the cases 56 on hand, what is sought to be projected is a possible conflict arising out of the exercise of a fundamental right by one individual, in a manner infringing upon the free exercise of the fundamental right of another person. But this conflict is age old.