Quantum of compensation - SC UNION OF INDIA VERSUS RINA DEVI
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4945 OF 2018
(SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL)NO.10223 @ D.NO.6059 OF 2018)
UNION OF INDIA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
RINA DEVI ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J
1. This appeal has been preferred against award of compensation
of Rs.4 lakhs under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 (1989
Act).
2. The respondent filed claim for compensation for death of her
husband Jatan Gope in an ‘untoward incident’ on 20th August,
2002. Her case is that the deceased had purchased a ticket of
second class for Karauta to Khusrupur by train No.532. He fell
down from the train due to rush of passengers and died on the
spot. One Kailash Gope who witnessed the deceased purchasing
the ticket and boarding the train filed an affidavit stating these
facts. He was not cross-examined. Case of the respondent is that
the ticket was not recovered from possession of the deceased as it
may have been lost somewhere.
3. The claim was contested by the appellant. It was stated that
the deceased was not a passenger but was wandering near the
railway track. Cousin of the deceased who lodged FIR stated the
deceased was suffering from mental disorder and was wandering
in that state of mind. However, he was not examined as a witness.
4. The Tribunal dismissed the claim on the ground that it was not
a case of ‘untoward incident’ but a case of ‘run over’. The
deceased was not a bona fide passenger
5. The High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal by relying
upon the evidence of Kailash Gope who filed affidavit to the effect
that the deceased had purchased the ticket and had boarded the
train. The said witness has not been cross-examined. Reliance was
placed on a Division Bench judgment of the High Court in
Kaushalaya Devi versus Union of India through General
Manager, North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur, U.P.
1
to the
1 PLJR 2008 (3), page 711
effect that if a dead body is found in the precincts of the Railway
Station, there is a presumption that the deceased was a bona fide
passenger. Onus to prove that he was a ticketless traveller was on
the Railway. Judgment of this Court in Kamrunissa versus Union
of India
2
to the effect that the ‘run over’ was different from
‘untoward incident’ was distinguished. Therein, there was no
evidence about the deceased purchasing the ticket as in the
present case.
....
8. Vide order dated 13th March, 2018, we noted the issue of
apparent conflict in Rathi Menon versus Union of India
3
and
Kalandi Charan Sahoo versus General Manager, South-East
Central Railway, Bilaspur
4 as to the relevant date for applying
the rate of compensation when different rate is applicable at the
time of filing of claim and on the date of the order. A submission
has been filed by the Registrar Principal Bench, Railway Claims
Tribunal seeking clarification on four subjects which repeatedly
arise before the said Tribunal i.e. :
(i) Quantum of compensation: It is stated that there is a
conflict in the decisions in Rathi Menon (supra) and
Kalandi Charan Sahoo (supra) which needs
clarification. We have already taken note of this issue.
(ii) Definition of passenger: Whether any person found
dead near the track on Railway Precincts can be held to
3 (2001) 3 SCC 714, para 30
4 Civil Appeal No.5608 of 2017 decided on 25.4.2017
4
be a bona fide passenger for maintainability of a claim
for compensation in absence of recovery of a ticket from
his body. Conflicting decisions of Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Agam Shanthamma versus Union of India
5
;
Kerala High Court in Union of India versus
Leelamma
6
; Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in
Union of India versus Surekha
7
; Ramdhan versus
Union of India
8
; & Union of India versus Nandabai
9
;
Calcutta High Court in Asharani Das versus Union of
India
10
; and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Raj Kumari
versus Union of India
11
are required to be resolved on
this subject.
(iii) The concept of self inflicted injury: Whether attempt
of getting into or getting down a moving train resulting in
an accident was a case of ‘self inflicted injury’ so as not
to entitle to any compensation or no such concept could
not apply under the scheme of law which casts strict
liability to pay compensation by the Railway under
5 (2004) ACJ 713
6 2009 (1) KLT 914
7 (2011) ACJ 1845
8 (2009) ACJ 2487
9 (2016) ACJ 411
102009 (2) CalLT 467
11 (1993) ACJ 846
5
Sections 124 and 124A. In this regard views of the High
Courts of Kerala in Joseph PT versus Union of India
12
,
Bombay in Pushpa versus Union of India
13 and Delhi
in Shayam Narayan versus Union of India
14
may
appear to be against the decisions of this Court in Union
of India versus Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar
15
and
Jameela versus Union of India
16
.
(iv) Award of interest. The Act is silent about the interest.
In Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi versus Union of India
17
,
this Court held that the CPC could be invoked and
interest awarded at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of
application till the date of award and 9% p.a. interest
from the date of award till the date of payment. In
Mohamadi versus Union of India
18
interest at the rate
of 9% was awarded without any difference between the
date of application and date of award or for subsequent
award.
....
13. We have anxiously considered the rival submissions. We
consider it necessary to quote the relevant provisions of the 1989
Act :
“S.123. Definitions. - In this Chapter, unless the
context otherwise requires,-
(a) "accident" means an accident of the nature
described in section 124;
(b) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
1[(c) "untoward incident" means--
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(2) the accidental falling of any passenger from a train
carrying passengers.]
S.124. Extent of liabililty - When in the course of
working a railway, an accident occurs, being either a
collision between trains of which one is a train carrying
passengers or the derailment of or other accident to a
train or any part of a train carrying passengers, then
10
whether or not there has been any wrongful act,
neglect or default on the part of the railway
administration such as would entitle a passenger who
has been injured or has suffered a loss to maintain an
action and recover damages in respect thereof, the
railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law, be liable to pay
compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and
to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of a
passenger dying as a result of such accident, and for
personal injury and loss, destruction, damage or
deterioration of goods owned by the passenger and
accompanying him in his compartment or on the train,
sustained as a result of such accident.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section
"passenger" includes a railway servant on duty.
S.124A. Compensation on account of untoward
incident - When in the course of working a railway an
untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has
been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of
the railway administration such as would entitle a
passenger who has been injured or the dependant of a
passenger who has been killed to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway
administration shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law, be liable to pay
compensation to such extent as may be
prescribed and to that extent only for loss occasioned
by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of
such untoward incident:
Provided that no compensation shall be payable under
this section by the railway administration if the
passenger dies or suffers injury due to--
(a) suicide or attempted suicide by him;
(b) self-inflicted injury;
(c) his own criminal act;
(d) any act committed by him in a state of intoxication
or insanity;
(e) any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical
treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary
due to injury caused by the said untoward incident.
11
Explanation. --For the purposes of this section,
"passenger" includes--
(i) a railway servant on duty; and
(ii) a person who has purchased a valid ticket for
travelling by a train carrying passengers, on any date or
a valid platform ticket and becomes a victim of an
untoward incident.]”
14. In exercise of power under Section 129 of the 1989 Act, the
Central Government framed rules called Railway Accidents and
Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990. The rules
provided for a schedule prescribing the amount of compensation
payable in respect of death and injuries. The said rules have been
amended w.e.f. 1st January, 2017 by notification dated 22nd
December, 2016 substituting the schedule by higher amount of
compensation
Re: (i) Quantum of Compensation
15.1 In Rathi Menon (supra), this Court considered the
question whether the compensation to be applied would be as per
rules applicable on the date of the order or as per the rules in force
at the time of accident or the untoward incident. Reversing the
view taken by the Kerala High Court that the liability to pay
compensation arises as soon as accident happens and not when
the quantum is determined, this Court held that liability is to pay
compensation ‘as may be prescribed’ which means as on the date
of the order of the Tribunal. This Court observed that if
interpretation placed by the Kerala High Court was to be accepted
and the claimant was to get compensation in terms of market
value which prevailed on the date of the accident, the money value
of the compensation will be reduced value on account of lapse of
time. The revision of rate by the Central Government may itself
show that the money value has come down. The Tribunal must
apply the rate applicable as per the rules at the time of making of
the order for payment of compensation28. This Court distinguished
judgments of the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo
(supra), P.A. Narayanan versus Union of India
29 and Maghar
28 Paras 29 and 30
29 (1998) 3 SCC 67
13
Singh versus Jashwant Singh
30
. It was observed that Pratap
Narain Singh Deo (supra) and Maghar Singh (supra) were
judgments under the Workmen Compensation Act where the
scheme was different as in the said Act there was a provision for
interest and penalty if deposit was not made. Judgment in P.A.
Narayanan (supra) was relied upon to support the view that
therein compensation was awarded even though accident was of a
date much earlier to the rules providing for compensation.
15.2. Learned ASG for the appellant submitted that view in
Rathi Menon (supra) stands watered down by subsequent
decisions especially in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi (supra),
Mohamadi (supra) and Kalandi Charan Sahoo (supra). Rathi
Menon (supra) was premised on the basis that there was no law
for interest and there will be injustice if compensation was paid at
money value which had got reduced by the time the compensation
was paid. Factually interest was awarded in Rathi Menon (Supra).
It was on that basis that judgments in Workmen Compensation
cases were held to be distinguishable though the said judgments
are of larger Benches31. Subsequently in Thazhathe Purayil
Sarabi (supra) it has been held by this Court, after referring to
30 (1998) 9 SCC 134
31 Para 33 of the judgment
14
Rathi Menon (supra), that right to claim compensation accrued
on the date of the incident though compensation is computed on
the date of the award of the Tribunal. To compensate for loss of
money value on account of lapse of time and for the denial of right
to utilize the money when due, interest was required to be paid32
.
Accordingly, this Court directed payment of interest on the
awarded sum from the date of application till the date of recovery.
This view was followed in Mohamadi (supra). In Kalandi Charan
Sahoo (supra), without any specific discussion on the legal issue
involved, direction was issued for payment of compensation which
was applicable at the material time and the same was assumed to
be of Rs.4 lakhs. In that case, the accident took place in the year
2005 and the award of the Tribunal was in 2009 i.e. prior to 1st
January, 2017.
15.3. Learned amicus has referred to judgments of this Court in
Raman Iron Foundry (supra) and Kesoram Industries (supra)
to submit that quantum of compensation applicable is to be as on
the award of the Tribunal as the amount due is only on that day
and not earlier. In Kesoram Industries (supra), the question was
when for purposes of calculating ‘net wealth’ under the Wealth Tax
32 Para 26
15
Act, 1957 provision for payment of tax could be treated as ‘debt
owed’ within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the said Act. This
Court held that ‘debt’ was obligation to pay. The sum payable on a
contingency, however, does not become ‘debt’ until the said
contingency happens. The liability to pay tax arises on such tax
being quantified. But when the rate of tax is ascertainable, the
amount can be treated as debt for the year for which the tax is due
for purposes of valuation during the accounting year in question.
There is no conflict in the ratio of this judgment with the principle
propounded in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi (supra) that in the
present context right to compensation arises on the date of the
accident. In Raman Iron Foundry (supra), the question was
whether a claim for unliquidated damages does not give rise to ‘a
debt’ till the liability is determined. It was held that no debt arises
from a claim for unliquidated damages until the liability is
adjudicated. Even from this judgment it is not possible to hold that
the liability for compensation, in the present context, arises only
on determination thereof and not on the date of accident. Since it
has been held that interest is required to be paid, the premise on
which Rathi Menon (supra) is based has changed. We are of the
view that law in the present context should be taken to be that the
16
liability will accrue on the date of the accident and the amount
applicable as on that date will be the amount recoverable but the
claimant will get interest from the date of accident till the payment
at such rate as may be considered just and fair from time to time.
In this context, rate of interest applicable in motor accident claim
cases can be held to be reasonable and fair. Once concept of
interest has been introduced, principles of Workmen Compensation
Act can certainly be applied and judgment of 4-Judge Bench in
Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) will fully apply. Wherever it is
found that the revised amount of applicable compensation as on
the date of award of the Tribunal is less than the prescribed
amount of compensation as on the date of accident with interest,
higher of the two amounts ought to be awarded on the principle of
beneficial legislation. Present legislation is certainly a piece of
beneficent legislation.33
15.4 Accordingly, we conclude that compensation will be
payable as applicable on the date of the accident with interest as
may be considered reasonable from time to time on the same
pattern as in accident claim cases. If the amount so calculated is
less than the amount prescribed as on the date of the award of the
33 Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (supra) Para 12
17
Tribunal, the claimant will be entitled to higher of the two amounts.
This order will not affect the awards which have already become
final and where limitation for challenging such awards has expired,
this order will not by itself be a ground for condonation of delay.
Seeming conflict in Rathi Menon (supra) and Kalandi Charan
Sahoo (supra) stands explained accordingly. The 4-Judge Bench
judgment in Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) holds the field on
the subject and squarely applies to the present situation.
Compensation as applicable on the date of the accident has to be
given with reasonable interest and to give effect to the mandate of
beneficial legislation, if compensation as provided on the date of
award of the Tribunal is higher than unrevised amount with
interest, the higher of the two amounts has to be given.